A survey released this week by Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies offered further insight into how Taiwanese view the nation’s security environment and their own role in defending it.
The “American Portrait” survey is a Taiwan-based telephone questionnaire survey conducted annually with the goal of understanding the public’s perception of the US and China as well as their support for US policies toward Taiwan.
The results of this year’s survey highlighted three important trends — the public’s willingness to defend the nation in the event of a Chinese invasion remains high, confidence in the US’ credibility has declined and a majority of Taiwanese support bolstering Taiwan’s defense capabilities through public spending.
The survey’s most noteworthy finding is that public resolve to defend the nation remains strong. About 60 percent of the 1,206 respondents indicated that they would be willing to resist an attack by China “at all costs” without US military intervention.
Interestingly, willingness to fight saw little change — a drop of about 2 percent — under the assumption of US involvement, suggesting that the majority of Taiwanese view defending the nation as their own responsibility rather than contingent on foreign assistance.
This reflects a broader trend that has been observed in multiple surveys over the past several decades. Despite mounting pressure from China, a majority of Taiwanese have consistently expressed willingness to defend the nation over time — although the size of that majority appears to be gradually shrinking.
It is important to note that political affiliation typically has a strong influence on responses, with supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party expressing stronger resolve than supporters of the opposition. However, the overall picture is one of a society with a durable sense of civic responsibility and national identity.
This year’s results demonstrated an alarming shift in public perceptions toward the credibility of Washington, with the proportion of respondents who view the US as credible having decreased by 11 percent since 2021.
Yet, that decline has not followed a steady downward trajectory. Favorable views toward the US grew more positive between 2023 and 2024, before dropping again this year, demonstrating uncertainty surrounding the long-term reliability of US commitments. Political volatility in Washington, particularly the resurgence of an “America First” rhetoric, is likely to blame.
Throughout his second term, US President Donald Trump’s approach toward foreign policy has emphasized domestic economic priorities and transactional diplomacy, with “reciprocal” tariffs and trade disputes reinforcing the perception that the US is increasingly looking inward.
The expansion of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co facilities in the US, for example, might have fueled debates over whether Taiwan’s “silicon shield” is being intentionally diluted. Repeated calls from Washington for Taiwan to increase defense spending and accelerate arms procurement might also be interpreted as external pressure.
Despite shifts in public perceptions, US policy toward Taiwan has remained broadly supportive across multiple administrations. Polls in the US consistently show that a majority of Americans support aiding Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
Although the survey’s results revealed growing ambivalence toward a major democratic partner, it also showed clear public support for bolstering national defense. A majority of respondents said they support increasing the defense budget to 3 percent of GDP, while nearly 70 percent expressed support for Taiwan’s procurement of US weapons.
The public recognizes that Taiwan’s security ultimately depends on the country’s willingness to invest in its defense. This makes the ongoing political deadlock surrounding the government’s proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.16 billion) special defense budget particularly counterintuitive. The bill has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for months amid partisan disputes.
The delay risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s allies and adversaries about its commitment to self-defense: Prolonged political wrangling would only continue to sow doubts within the democratic world while emboldening Beijing to test Taiwan’s resolve.
Although public opinion polls should never be treated as the sole guide for policymaking, these findings do offer an important reminder that Taiwanese grasp the realities of their nation’s security environment.
Lawmakers should take note: The public understands the importance of reinforcing Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities amid an increasingly volatile environment, and it is time legislators do the same.
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