Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Legislator Li Zhenxiu (李貞秀), who was born in China and moved to Taiwan after marrying a Taiwanese citizen, is one of the party’s new legislators-at-large. However, she has not yet renounced her Chinese nationality.
Article 20 of the Nationality Act (國籍法) clearly stipulates: “If a national of the Republic of China [ROC] who concurrently has the nationality of another country wants to hold a government office limited by nationality as determined by this Article, they shall handle the waiver of the other country’s nationality before taking office and complete the loss of that country’s nationality and the acquisition of certification documents within one year from the date of taking office.”
Taiwan’s laws explicitly prohibit people with dual nationality from holding public office. I myself was once subject to this requirement, and my experience might serve as a reference. In 1993, I was selected as a legislator-at-large for the Democratic Progressive Party. Upon returning to Taiwan, I followed regulations and inquired with the American Institute in Taiwan about the procedures for renouncing my US citizenship. I was informed that because Taiwan and the US have no official diplomatic relations, I had to travel to another country with a US embassy to take an oath of renunciation.
I promptly booked a flight to the US embassy in Japan. On the morning of my arrival, US officials inquired about my reasons for renouncing my citizenship and urged me to reconsider. I explained my legal obligation to assume public office in Taiwan. Although they respected my decision, they still asked me to take half a day to reflect. I left the embassy temporarily and returned later that afternoon to reaffirm my intent. They then issued me a document titled “Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States,” which contained my personal information and the signature of a US official. After returning to Taiwan, I immediately submitted the renunciation certificate to the Legislative Yuan — only then was the legal procedure for assuming public office with a single nationality considered complete.
In Li’s case, the possibility exists that China might refuse to allow Chinese spouses to renounce their nationality. This highlights the paradox for people with such status holding public office in Taiwan. The Chinese government not only denies the legitimacy of Taiwan’s government system, but has also threatened military force — therefore, for a Chinese national to hold public office in Taiwan clearly creates a conflict of loyalty.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly clarified the duty of loyalty required of civil servants. Interpretation No. 618 states: “No person from the Mainland Area who has been permitted to enter into the Taiwan Area may serve as a public functionary unless he or she has had a household registration in the Taiwan Area for at least 10 years.”
It further emphasizes that “a public functionary, once appointed and employed by the State, shall be entrusted with official duties by the State under public law and shall owe a duty of loyalty to the State.” Granting differentiated treatment regarding their eligibility to serve as a civil servant was thus deemed reasonable.
Furthermore, Interpretation No. 768 states that people with dual nationality may not work as government-contracted physicians. The grand justices held that physicians working in public hospitals also fall within the category of civil servants as defined under the Civil Service Employment Act (公務人員任用法). As such, they are subject to the same restrictions applicable to civil servants with dual nationality — those already appointed must be dismissed. This was deemed to serve the legitimate purpose of maintaining loyalty between the state and its civil servants.
A comprehensive review of the two constitutional interpretations shows that their core principles are firmly grounded in the duty of loyalty required of public officials. Their reasoning is clear — given that many Western countries are generally friendly toward Taiwan, a person who holds Canadian citizenship is generally seen as posing fewer national security concerns, yet they are still barred from serving as government-contracted physicians. By contrast, China allows people who hold People’s Republic of China citizenship to serve as ROC legislators. This clearly deviates from empirical reasoning. Even if current laws and regulations are still imperfect, according to the legal argument of minori ad maius — what is true for a smaller, less important case must be even more true for a larger, more significant one — it is a clear breach of the duty of loyalty.
Mark Chen is a former minister of foreign affairs.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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