For decades, Pingtung County (屏東縣) in southern Taiwan has been conspicuously left behind in the development of high-speed rail (HSR). Counties such as Yunlin (雲林縣) and Miaoli (苗栗縣) were incorporated into the HSR network years ago and have since begun to reap the benefits — industrial clustering, population mobility and stronger regional connectivity. Pingtung, by contrast, has spent decades petitioning for HSR access, only to find itself trapped in an endless loop of planning studies and feasibility assessments. While other regions already enjoy fast and reliable long-distance transport, Pingtung is still being asked whether it “really needs” HSR. This is not merely a development gap; it is a long-standing failure of transportation equity.
Even after the proposed southern extension route through Kaohsiung entered the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process, some EIA committee members continued to question its necessity. Their objections have been familiar: excessive overlap with Taiwan Railway Corp routes, the existence of express highways and the national freeway network, and allegedly limited tourism benefits. Yet these arguments miss the reality of local transportation needs. The core function of HSR is to handle long-distance, cross-county travel, including business trips and homeward travel for residents working elsewhere. This is fundamentally different from the role of conventional rail, motorcycles or private cars, which primarily serve commuting, tourism and short-distance mobility. To dismiss HSR on the basis of existing road or rail density is to conflate different modes of transport designed for different purposes — and to disregard what local communities are actually asking for.
Equally troubling is the composition of the EIA committee itself — most committee members have spent their careers in northern Taiwan, followed by central Taiwan. Only one member is from Kaohsiung; none are from Pingtung. A major infrastructure project with profound implications for southern development is thus being judged almost entirely through non-local lenses. Concerns about institutional bias are difficult to dismiss.
The system already recognizes the need for representational balance through gender quotas; committee composition is clearly adjustable. For projects that could shape regional development for generations, geographic representation should also be taken seriously, allowing local experience to inform national decisionmaking.
At the local level, Pingtung has not been idle. Pingtung County Commissioner Chou Chun-mi (周春米) has continued pressing the central government for the southern HSR extension, completing urban planning work and advancing complementary development around the proposed station.
Former Pingtung County commissioner and Presidential Office Secretary-General Pan Men-an (潘孟安), one of the earliest and most vocal advocates for the extension, should continue to assist in overcoming institutional and administrative obstacles. The extension of HSR to Pingtung should not stall because of personnel changes, nor should it be worn down by repeated friction between central and local authorities.
Finally, lawmakers from Kaohsiung and Pingtung, particularly those from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), must treat this issue with the seriousness it deserves. Extending HSR southward is a piece of basic infrastructure that requires real political commitment. If clear positions and collective advocacy remain absent, a review 10 years from now might find Kaohsiung and Pingtung still stuck at square one. Pingtung has waited long enough. There is no justification for further delay. Extending HSR to Pingtung is overdue — but it is also indispensable — for achieving genuine transportation equity.
Yeh Yu-chin is a civil servant.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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