The kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Japan’s Niigata Prefecture was again forced to suspend operations after a control rod alarm malfunction. Although there was no radioactive fallout, it exposed a long-underestimated reality: Nuclear safety risks often stem not from a single equipment failure, but from shortcomings in institutional execution and a failure to embed a robust safety culture.
Control rods are the most critical safety components of a nuclear reactor, and an abnormal trigger is not just an engineering issue; it also reflects gaps in process design, testing, cross-departmental coordination and quality control. That such problems recur in Japan — one of the countries with the most extensive experience in nuclear power operations and the strictest safety regulations — show gaps in inspections and safety controls that cannot be overlooked.
Genuine safety culture means that even under the pressure of schedules and political expectations, the system still empowers on-site personnel to shut down operations and make corrections when necessary — even if that means shouldering the costs.
The suspension of the plant’s restart highlights that even when well-designed systems are in place, safety culture could still erode in practice.
For Taiwan, this point is particularly salient. Nuclear policy debates tend to focus on supply stability, carbon reduction needs and cost-effectiveness, while failing to examine the deeper issues. Do nuclear safety regulators truly possess institutional independence? Can information regarding review processes and resumption of operations be disclosed in a timely manner? Does the system allow for shutdown and corrective mechanisms to be triggered, even under political pressure? If such questions are not addressed, technical compliance alone would not ease the public’s doubts.
Nuclear safety is also a matter of trust. More than a decade after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and the subsequent nuclear disaster, Japan is still struggling to rebuild public trust. Taiwan, too, has long felt public unease over nuclear safety amid last year’s referendum on restarting the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant and long-standing energy debates. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant serves as a reminder that it is far more difficult to restore lost trust than to pass equipment inspections.
Talks about restarting nuclear power plants is a test of governance. The real question should be whether institutions can ensure that safety practices are consistently enforced, and oversight is transparent and verifiable. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa blunder is a wake-up call that nuclear safety cannot be a mere slogan — it must be a core principle of decisionmaking and operations.
If Taiwan wishes to seriously contemplate restarting nuclear power, it must first revive institutional trust and governance capacity.
Lin Ren-bin is a Taiwan Environmental Protection Union member and Chinese Culture University Department of Chemical and Materials Engineering associate professor.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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