EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas says that China and Russia must be having a “field day” about US President Donald Trump’s plans for Greenland, which Kallas thinks would divide NATO.
Yet, according to Trump, his plans are motivated by a desire to counter the very threat that Kallas identified.
“World peace is at stake! China and Russia want Greenland, and there is not a thing that Denmark can do about it,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on Saturday.
Viewed from Beijing, Trump’s moves on Greenland represent further proof that the US-led world order is in turmoil, a trend that creates a significant opportunity for China.
“Most Chinese people view this as yet another manifestation of Trump’s bullying, hegemonic and domineering behavior,” says Wang Wen (王文), a professor at Renmin University in Beijing. However, Wang adds: “Trump’s occupation of Greenland would signify NATO’s demise, a prospect that would greatly please Chinese people.”
For years, there has been a growing drumbeat in US foreign policy circles raising the alarm about China’s — and Russia’s — increased presence in the arctic region. In 2019, the then-US secretary of state Mike Pompeo said that Beijing’s influence risked creating a “new South China Sea” around the north pole as he pledged to beef up the US’ presence there.
However, when it comes to Greenland, Chinese stakeholders have struggled to gain a significant foothold, in part because of resistance from the US and Denmark. In 2018, reportedly under pressure from the US, Denmark blocked a bid from a Chinese state-owned company to expand a network of Greenlandic airports. A Chinese company was also blocked from buying an abandoned naval base in Greenland two years earlier.
“I doubt there is a single Chinese strategist who would have listed the US annexing Greenland as being among their security concerns,” says Andrew Small, director of the Asia program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “They have, on the other hand, seen the US alliance network as one of the most significant aspects of US strategic edge over China, and they saw the potential for that alliance network to be mobilized against China as one of their greatest concerns… the unraveling of US alliances brings a host of benefits [for Beijing].”
Beijing’s official line is that it opposes attempts by the US to undermine the UN Charter, a treaty that guarantees the sovereignty of states. On Monday, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) urged the US to stop using the “so-called ‘China threat’” in Greenland as a pretext for imposing tariffs on European countries.
Still, China’s limited interests in Greenland are not for lack of trying. Between 2012 and 2017, China’s foreign direct investment in Greenland represented more than 11 percent of the territory’s GDP, a far greater share than in other arctic nations.
Greenland’s desire to attract Chinese investment to help it exploit its mineral resources has sometimes been at odds with the security concerns of Denmark, which controls the territory’s security and foreign affairs, and of other NATO allies.
In 2018, China published a white paper outlining its arctic policy. Somewhat implausibly, it described itself as a “near-arctic state” with corresponding interests in the region. The paper said China “hopes to work with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing the arctic shipping routes,” positioning China’s arctic strategy as being part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) signature Belt and Road Initiative. China also stressed the opportunities for scientific research in the arctic.
In October, the first step along the Polar Silk Road came to fruition. A Chinese container ship from Ningbo in east China docked in Felixstowe port in Suffolk, England. The arrival marked the first time that a ship had traveled from China to Europe via the northern sea route, a shipping route that runs along Russia’s arctic coastline. The journey along a route operated by a Chinese-controlled container line took just 20 days, said Chinese state media, about half the typical journey time.
However, that trade route relies primarily on cooperation with Russia. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Beijing has drawn closer to Moscow and been viewed with greater suspicion by European countries, especially Russia’s neighbors. For years, Chinese companies struggled to turn mining projects in Greenland into lucrative business ventures. Trump’s overt interest in the territory has only made things harder.
“Since Donald Trump’s first presidential term… Chinese companies in Greenland have faced pushback from the United States and Denmark, and Beijing itself seems to have discouraged investment there in recent years,” Patrik Andersson at the Swedish National China Center said.
“China’s engagement in Greenland today is extremely limited,” he added.
Some have pointed to China’s 6.5 percent stake in the Kvanefjeld mining project in Greenland as evidence of China’s interests in the territory’s rare earths, but Andersson points out that the project has been inactive since the Greenlandic government banned uranium mining in 2021.
“Given US and Danish opposition to Chinese activity in Greenland, and the wider western efforts to build rare earth supply chains independent of China, it is also unlikely that Chinese companies would be allowed to invest in any other Greenlandic rare earth projects,” Andersson says.
Regardless, Beijing is trying to figure out how to deal with a US leader who is smashing up the global alliances that have countered China’s rise, but whose unpredictability and strongman sensibilities could yet threaten China’s interests.
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