The situation in Japan unfolding over immigration in the past few years, and its social implications, are well worth Taiwan’s attention. As the number of Chinese middle class and working professionals relocating overseas rises, Japan has become one of their top destinations. This particular wave of Chinese immigration is driven less by career prospects or cultural affinities, and more by aspirations for safer communities, stable law and order, and a higher quality of life.
Compared with previous waves where immigrants spent years studying Japanese and actively sought to integrate into society and put down roots, this group has chosen to maintain their existing social circles, in addition to not learning Japanese and not participating in local communities. For them, establishing long-term connections is not a priority, creating a unique situation in which they might be physically based or own homes in Japan, but their lives are elsewhere.
These immigrants do not necessarily enter the labor market, but bring in foreign capital that is largely concentrated in Tokyo’s hottest property markets, such as Minato and Koto, or buy large numbers of houses in other regional cities as rental or investment properties.
This, by and large, is entirely legal, but has the material consequence of driving up house prices and intensifying competition in the market. Young people and local residents, already under pressure due to the cost of living, consequently feel that they are being squeezed out. When people see cash-rich immigrants, through some loophole in the system, being allowed in seemingly obligation-free, public opinion will naturally take a turn for the worse.
It is important to see that the anti-immigrant sentiment in Japanese society is not just a simple racist or xenophobic resurgence, but a product of collective anxiety over a feeling that social fairness is being eroded. In the face of certain groups appearing to benefit from Japan’s public security, infrastructure and stability without learning the language or meaningfully engaging in society, long-held conservative yet still tolerant attitudes toward immigrants have taken a turn for the worse. In the past few years, the Japanese government has increased the requirements for business visa applicants, tightened eligibility checks, and started to review real-estate laws and the residency system in an effort to respond to and quell public discontent.
A similar situation unfolding in Taiwan is not a distant possibility. With low birthrates and an aging population, Taiwan is also facing labor shortages, industrial upgrading challenges and structural population imbalances. The question of whether it needs more people from overseas has increasingly risen in policy discussions. Japan’s experience should serve as a warning that if immigration policy neglects to consider social cohesion and public responsibilities and focuses only on capital inflows, investments or short-term economic benefits, immigration as a population booster can quickly become a source of friction.
The objectives of Taiwan’s immigration and long-term resident policy system remain hazy at best. On one hand, the government hopes to attract foreign talent and investment; on the other, it has yet to provide clear and understandable specifications in regards to language proficiency, community engagement, investment in real estate and long-term civic duties. If there is little systematic differentiation between immigration for actual residence and work purposes, and purely capital-based immigration, an influx of capital-driven immigrants into the housing market would inevitably exacerbate the housing pressure on ordinary Taiwanese. In turn, this could foment public dissatisfaction and ultimately damage Taiwan’s otherwise relatively open-minded and friendly collective disposition.
If Taiwan wishes to create a truly long-lasting immigration policy, it first needs to be clear on whom it wants to attract and whom it wants to stay. Questions of whether language study should become a requirement for long-term residency; whether purchasing a house should be contingent on actual residence, work or family ties; and whether long-term or permanent residence rights should take tax contributions, community engagement and local links into account should not be dismissed as xenophobic. They are important choices to be made in the process of ensuring that the immigration system is able to foster social integration and not exacerbate division.
The essence of an immigration program is not just about who comes in, but the kind of society it wants to become. Japan’s tightening of its immigration policy is a forced and direct response to mounting social pressures. Taiwan would do well to learn from its neighbor and, instead of tightening policy after house prices shoot up and public sentiment takes a turn, act now to establish a long-term immigration governance framework that balances openness, order and social integration. Rather than becoming a policy quandary kicked down the road, immigration can, in this way, function as a genuinely positive force for society.
Eason Chen is an engineer.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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