The significance of recent US moves in Venezuela is not limited to Latin America. After the initial uncertainty about what was about to come, things have stabilized in the South American country. Its former vice president Delcy Rodriguez has been sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president and has expressed her willingness to work with the US.
By gaining leverage over one of the world’s largest concentrations of oil and mineral wealth, Washington has expanded its ability to shape global resource flows, and that has direct implications for Taiwan. Not because Taiwan would suddenly gain access to Venezuelan oil or rare earth minerals, but because US control over those resources expands the range of tools Washington could deploy to stabilize the ecosystem on which Taiwan depends.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, along with major deposits of gold, iron ore, bauxite, and minerals such as coltan that are increasingly relevant to advanced manufacturing and defense supply chains. For years, these resources were effectively removed from US-aligned systems by sanctions, financial restrictions and political isolation. With that barrier partially lifted, the US has increased its capacity to redirect supply, influence pricing and buffer allied economies against shocks.
For Taiwan, whose economy is built on semiconductor manufacturing and near-total dependence on imported energy and materials, this shift matters in concrete ways. Taiwan imports more than 95 percent of its energy. Oil, coal and liquefied natural gas power households and sustain the fabrication plants that make the nation indispensable to the global economy. These supplies arrive almost entirely by sea, leaving Taiwan exposed to market
volatility, shipping disruptions and risks that it cannot control.
Washington’s expanding leverage over global energy markets allows it to act as a stabilizer for systems Taiwan depends on. Venezuelan oil flowing back into US-aligned markets could reduce pressure on global prices, ease competition for liquefied natural gas and free up alternative supplies for allies.
The same logic applies to minerals. Semiconductor manufacturing depends on a wide array of inputs: rare earth elements, specialty metals, precision chemicals and ultra-pure materials sourced through complex global supply chains. Taiwan does not control these chains. When supply tightens or prices spike, Taiwan absorbs the shock.
US influence over Venezuelan iron ore, gold and critical minerals expands Washington’s ability to reinforce upstream supply for its own industrial base and that of close partners. This creates room for the US to prioritize access for industries it deems strategically essential, including Taiwan’s semiconductor sector. That support is likely to take indirect forms: guaranteed offtake agreements, expanded processing capacity in the US, shared stockpiles held outside Taiwan, and preferential access to US-based refining and materials hubs.
This approach aligns with how Washington already treats Taiwan’s chip industry. The US is willing to invest heavily to ensure continuity of production, but it does so by integrating Taiwan more deeply into US-centered industrial systems rather than by making Taiwan resource-independent. Recent announcements that Taipei and Washington have reached a general consensus on a bilateral trade agreement, alongside expanded Taiwanese investment in US semiconductor facilities, reflect this strategy of managed integration.
Energy security remains the clearest constraint. Taiwan’s reliance on imported fossil fuels leaves it vulnerable to supply disruptions even in scenarios short of open conflict. Renewable energy expansion offers long-term promise, but it cannot yet provide the baseload stability required by energy-intensive manufacturing. Nuclear power remains politically constrained. These realities mean Taiwan’s resilience depends not only on domestic policy, but on the stability of energy markets.
Here again, US leverage matters. By shaping energy flows from major producers such as Venezuela, Washington could dampen volatility that would otherwise hit Taiwan first. This is not necessarily altruism, but actions rooted in self-interest. Advanced chips produced in Taiwan underpin US defense systems, artificial intelligence development and high-end manufacturing. Preventing disruption to that supply is a strategic priority.
What Washington is unlikely to do is eliminate Taiwan’s dependence altogether. The US has strong incentives to reduce the risk of Taiwan’s industrial collapse. It has far less incentive to grant Taiwan autonomous control over upstream resources. Access to Venezuelan oil or minerals, if it expands, would remain mediated through US financial systems, regulatory frameworks and industrial policy priorities.
This creates a form of asymmetry. The US gains optionality. Taiwan gains stability, but not independence. Taiwanese firms might benefit from more predictable access to materials processed in the US or allied countries, but control over allocation remains upstream.
This distinction is crucial. Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance gives it leverage, but that leverage operates downstream. It is indispensable as a producer, not as a resource allocator. US control over energy and materials complements that arrangement by ensuring Taiwan can keep producing without gaining the autonomy that would dilute Washington’s influence.
The result is a system of managed dependence. Taiwan is protected enough to function, integrated deeply enough to matter and constrained enough to remain aligned. This model explains US willingness to incur risk over Taiwan and the limits of that support.
For Taiwan, the challenge is operating within narrow margins. Its economy combines extraordinary innovation with exposure to shocks it cannot fully mitigate domestically. Strategic reserves, grid resilience, diversified contracts and deeper integration with trusted partners could widen those margins, but they do not eliminate dependence.
The developments in Venezuela underscore how resource access is being reorganized in a more politicized global system. As major powers consolidate control over critical inputs, Taiwan’s security would depend not only on deterrence, but on whether the industrial system that sustains it could be kept running under pressure. There is no doubt that the US is now better positioned to do that, so the question is not whether Washington would act, but how much control it would retain while it does.
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taipei.
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