The sight of a hostile regional superpower launching an overnight raid to depose the leader of a smaller neighboring country could easily have sent pulses in Taiwan racing.
The US on Saturday last week revealed the details of a surprise raid to capture then-Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, who was whisked away to the US, where he was frogmarched into a court in New York on Monday.
Commentators in China immediately drew comparisons to how an assault on Taiwan could play out.
Illustration: Mountain People
China, a country with more than 1.4 billion people and the world’s biggest armed forces, has long had designs on Taiwan, a self-governing nation of 23 million in its backyard. The imbalance in power is comparable to that between the US, which possesses the world’s most powerful army, and Venezuela, a small, middle-income country of just 30 million which, like Taiwan, relies on friendly countries for its defense.
British Foreign Affairs Select Committee Chair Emily Thornberry warned that China and Russia might be emboldened by the lack of condemnation for the US’ actions, but events in the Americas are unlikely to change Beijing’s fundamental thinking with regards to Taiwan.
Firstly, although China cares about international narratives with regards to Taiwan, and puts great pressure on other countries to recognize Beijing’s claims on the nation, it does not see the matter as being one of international law. Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory and therefore a domestic political matter.
“Beijing has not refrained from kinetic or other actions on Taiwan out of deference to international law and norms. It has pursued a strategy of coercion without violence,” said Ryan Hass, a former US diplomat in Beijing and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Senior international relations academic Shen Dingli (沈丁立) laid out the official view: “Cross-strait relations are not international relations and are not governed by international law. The United States’ approach to Venezuela holds no relevance for cross-strait relations.”
On Chinese social media site Sina Weibo, one popular nationalist government affairs commentator wrote: “Stop linking the US actions in Venezuela to the Taiwan issue ... Their actions constitute a grave violation of international law and an infringement of Venezuela’s sovereignty, whereas our situation is strictly an internal national affair. There is absolutely no ‘comparability’ in terms of nature, methods or objectives.”
Secondly, the biggest deterrence for China in launching an attack on Taiwan is the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Although China has a more powerful military, Taiwan has the promise of support from the US in the event of an attack.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) last week conducted several days of intense military drills around Taiwan, designed to showcase its ability to blockade the nation and fend off international assistance.
The US Department of Defense believes that the PLA is on track to reach its goal of being able to achieve a “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan by next year, particularly with its rapid advances in military artificial intelligence, biotechnology and hypersonic missiles.
Rather than feel worried by the news in Venezuela, many in Taiwan said that the successful US military operation might actually give Beijing pause for thought.
Venezuela’s China-sourced weapons failed to defend against the US attack, some said.
Between 2010 and 2020, nearly 90 percent of China’s arms sales to the Americas went to Venezuela, according to ChinaPower, a research project hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“Why was the US military able to move in as if no one were there?” Tamkang University associate professor Lin Ying-yu (林穎佑) said.
“Everyone seemed to think that Chinese-made weapons were very impressive after the clashes between Indian and Pakistani air forces,” Lin said, referring to the success of Chinese-made jets used by Pakistan in a brief conflict with India last year. “But now, there seems to be a different interpretation.”
Atlantic Council Global China Hub nonresident fellow Sung Wen-ti (宋文笛) said: “The US military’s capacity for a decapitation strike, especially against Venezuela’s largely Chinese defense systems, ought to provide a deterrent that makes Beijing think about putting their [military] to the test against Washington.”
Still, US President Donald Trump’s flagrant disregard for the international rules-based order, and the speed at which Western leaders have toed Washington’s line, revealed the upending of global norms that is under way. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has declined to condemn Trump’s actions, despite the fact that experts have described the attack as illegal under international law. Many European leaders have also equivocated.
China said the US’ “blatant use of force against Venezuela seriously violates international law and basic norms in international relations.”
China, along with Russia, backed an emergency UN Security Council meeting over the legality of the operation.
Taiwan’s government declined to comment on the US’ actions, despite the fact that President William Lai (賴清德) has repeatedly talked of the need to defend the international rules-based order as a means of preventing a Chinese invasion.
One popular Taiwanese blogger said that to prevent itself from becoming “another Venezuela,” Taiwan should avoid causing trouble for the US, such as by becoming a source of drugs or refugees.
In a Facebook post that received more than 30,000 likes, YouTuber Chiu Wei-chieh (邱威傑), also known as “Froggy” Chiu, said that unlike in Venezuela, Taiwan’s leader has the popular support of the people.
“Taiwan should not become Venezuela. That means clenching our five fingers tighter, uniting, and not becoming easy prey in their eyes,” he wrote.
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