With the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in a period of enforced dormancy and India-Japan-Australia not attempting a trilateral engagement, the fortunes of each of the three nations have a bearing on the others.
In this context, Japan and China might close the year in a sharper configuration: deep strategic suspicion layered atop enduring economic interdependence, with Taiwan acting as the principal trip wire. This pattern is not new. What is new is the speed with which rhetoric has translated into multi-arena confrontation. Over the past few weeks, a single phrase uttered in Tokyo cascaded rapidly into diplomatic clashes at the UN, subtle, but consequential signaling around tourism and commerce, and riskier military encounters near Japan’s southwestern islands. The central question for next year is not whether tensions would persist, but whether the relationship slips into an uncontrolled downward spiral or stabilizes into a high-friction, yet managed, rivalry.
The trigger was Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks last month. Beijing demanded a retraction, casting the comments as implying intervention and breaching bilateral foundations.
Domestic politics in Japan help explain why that line has held. Takaichi’s approval rating has remained remarkably stable at about 75 percent, even as the dispute escalated. At the same time, a new Nikkei poll showed support for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party jumping five points to 41 percent. These figures matter. They suggest that, at least for now, firmness on security issues carries limited domestic political cost. This political cushion reduces incentives for an early rhetorical climbdown, even as it increases the importance of careful damage control to avoid unintended escalation.
Japan’s damage control relied on established diplomatic language. Officials cited the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communique, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as China’s sole legal government and “understanding and respecting” Beijing’s Taiwan position. Tokyo avoided operational specifics on any Taiwan contingency, consistent with its refusal to answer hypotheticals and case-by-case security judgements.
However, Beijing demanded an “accurate and complete” restatement, calling claims of “no change” evasive.
What set this episode apart was how quickly China internationalized the dispute. Beijing moved to the UN, submitting letters and statements casting Japan’s remarks as a threat to the post-World War II order, invoking the UN Charter, wartime history and past militarism. Japan rejected the claims as unsubstantiated, stressing legal limits on collective self-defense. The escalation aimed to shape “normal” diplomatic language on sovereignty and security.
From Beijing’s point of view, the episode has functioned as a rapid stress test with multiple objectives, many of which have already produced tangible effects.
First, it has nudged Japan back toward more formulaic restraint, with fewer improvisational references to Taiwan contingencies.
Second, it has signaled to third countries that rhetorical deviations on Taiwan can carry costs, including pressure on tourism flows and business sentiment.
Third, it has reinforced China’s effort to embed its Taiwan sovereignty narrative within UN-linked diplomacy.
Fourth, it has probed the US-Japan alliance, how quickly Washington reacts, and whether Tokyo can shape US messaging.
Fifth, it has provided a platform to reframe Japan’s defense reforms as “remilitarization,” that resonates strongly amid the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII memory politics of this year.
Sixth, and most consequentially, it has coincided with more frequent and increasingly normalized Chinese People’s Liberation Army activity, sometimes alongside Russian forces, around Japan’s southwest islands, establishing a new operational baseline even without open conflict.
This military layer makes risk management next year urgent.
The wider strategic context complicates matters. The National Security Strategy report of US President Donald Trump’s administration prioritizes the western hemisphere and domestic security, while still invoking deterrence in Asia. Analysts see an adjustment toward transactional alliances and escalation control. For Japan, this means limited US tolerance for new Taiwan rhetoric, even as reassurance appears during crises.
This context makes a sustained, but managed rivalry next year more plausible than a complete rupture. Japan has strong incentives to keep strategic temperatures below the threshold that could trigger broad economic retaliation, particularly as the Takaichi government pursues expansionary stimulus while navigating market anxieties over bonds, yields and the yen. China has incentives to demonstrate resolve in Taiwan without rupturing economic ties with one of its most important trade and technology partners, especially if Beijing keeps prioritizing domestic upgrading and stability as it advances toward its 2035 goals.
Ironically, Taiwan’s domestic politics might be the most volatile factor. Pressures to signal urgency, amplify threats and promise arms purchases can slide toward conflict-seeking behavior. If brinkmanship grows, Washington, Tokyo and Beijing risk being pushed into reactive postures, increasing accidents and self-fulfilling escalation.
Beijing is likely to maintain calibrated pressure on Tokyo so long as Takaichi’s remarks are not formally withdrawn.
However, the smarter move for all parties is to prevent Taiwan from becoming an automatic escalator across every arena. For Japan and China, the practical agenda is unglamorous, but essential: restore and harden crisis communication channels, reduce intercept risks and discipline diplomatic language so it does not lock either side into performative escalation. For the US, the task is to reassure allies while discouraging new trip wires that reduce Washington’s control over escalation. For Taiwan, the challenge is to seek leverage through resilience and diversified external ties.
Next year, Japan-China relations are likely to remain tense, competitive and fragile, but not necessarily uncontrollable. Whether they descend into crisis or stabilize into managed rivalry would depend less on grand strategy than on restraint, disciplined language and the willingness to prioritize prevention over panic.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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