Taiwan does not exist in a state of true peace. Its situation is more akin to a prolonged, unofficial state of political warfare. The Legislative Yuan, beyond being the venue of policy debate in Taiwan, has become the front line of resistance in the conflict. Understanding this strategic reality is crucial to understanding the amendments to the Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), which require legislators to obtain approval before traveling to China.
In his book On War, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote that “war is the continuation of policy by other means.” The threat of military force has long ceased to be all Taiwan faces — political engagement, infiltration and psychological manipulation have steadily eroded Taiwan’s defenses. This is the essence of political warfare: influencing a society’s decisions without ever firing a shot.
A series of espionage cases uncovered this year are concrete examples of this kind of political warfare. From military personnel being influenced into changing their stance on defense to former staff members of the Presidential Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being suspected of leaking classified information, these cases of infiltration are far from isolated incidents. They are the product of long-standing institutional vulnerabilities being repeatedly exploited.
The front line of this battle runs not along the middle of the Taiwan Strait, but right through the corridors of executive power and governance.
Another core theme of On War is the concept of a “center of gravity,” or the primary source of strength, will or stability of a military force, which, if targeted effectively, would cripple its ability to fight. Taiwan’s center of gravity is not any individual military asset, but its democratic credibility, parliamentary legitimacy and public trust in the nation’s will to defend itself.
Legislators control defense budgets, national security legislation, and have access to classified briefings. Their contact with foreign actors is of utmost strategic sensitivity. If legislators’ travel to China continues to lack oversight and transparency, it would leave a gap in the defenses against political warfare. Once the legislature’s external engagements become channels that hostile forces can exploit, democratic institutions risk being stripped of any meaningful autonomy, despite their external form appearing to remain intact.
The point of the legal amendments to the cross-strait act is not to cut off all exchanges, but to raise the cost of infiltration by requiring prior approval, full disclosure of activities, and imposing penalties for violations. If political infiltration is to be prevented, it can no longer be a zero-risk endeavor. The amendment is not a turn to authoritarianism, but a practical step toward defensive democracy. The regulations specifically target elected officials who hold power and access to classified information, not ordinary citizens.
Exchanges may continue, but the exercise of power must take place in the light of day. Only with transparency and accountability can institutions meaningfully serve as safeguards of democracy, rather than shackles.
Clausewitz warned that one of the greatest mistakes is to act on a false assumption of peace. In light of infiltration taking place through institutional channels, these legal amendments are not an overreaction; they are an acceptance of reality and a step toward patching vulnerabilities. In an era of authoritarian expansion, not pursuing a defense strategy would not be tolerance, but a dereliction of duty. Taiwan must make itself absolutely clear: We understand our position on the battlefield and we choose to defend our way of life through the rule of law and transparency.
Hsiao Hsi-huei is a freelance writer.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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