Tensions between Japan and China over Taiwan have again exposed the fragility of East Asia’s security architecture. Comments by Japanese leaders warning that a Chinese use of force against Taiwan could pose a direct threat to Japan’s security triggered sharp reactions from Beijing, reviving fears of escalation in an already crowded and militarized regional environment. While such episodes are often framed through the lens of great-power rivalry, they highlight the often-overlooked but critical role of ASEAN as a mediator — and the growing limitations of that role.
Historically, ASEAN has functioned as a stabilizing buffer in East Asia, providing inclusive platforms where rival powers could engage without confrontation. Forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit have helped institutionalize dialogue, manage tensions and prevent disputes from escalating into open conflict. In moments of Japan-China friction, ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality has offered smaller and middle powers alike a degree of reassurance that regional disputes could still be handled through multilateral norms rather than raw power.
However, ASEAN’s mediating capacity is being strained. The organization is not only grappling with external geopolitical pressures, but with serious internal challenges that undermine its coherence and credibility. One such challenge is the re-emergence of intra-ASEAN tensions, exemplified by the renewed border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia following the collapse of a short-lived ceasefire. These disputes underscore that ASEAN’s long-standing principle of conflict management among its own members is increasingly difficult to uphold.
More critically, ASEAN is facing a leadership vacuum. Traditional drivers of ASEAN diplomacy — most notably Indonesia — are preoccupied with domestic constraints. Political instability, complex electoral transitions and recurring natural disasters have absorbed diplomatic energy that would otherwise be directed toward regional leadership. Indonesia’s ability to act as a norm entrepreneur and honest broker, a role it has historically embraced, is more limited than in previous crises.
ASEAN’s leadership dilemma is complicated by the fact that its next chair, the Philippines, is itself deeply entangled in ongoing disputes with China over the South China Sea. While Manila has legitimate security concerns, its confrontation with Beijing inevitably raises questions about neutrality. In this context, ASEAN’s claim to act as an impartial mediator between Japan and China risks losing legitimacy, particularly in Beijing’s eyes.
These internal fractures coincide with a broader erosion of multilateralism. As great powers increasingly privilege unilateral actions, minilateral groupings and alliance-based deterrence, ASEAN’s consensus-driven and non-confrontational approach appears increasingly fragile. Paradoxically, this makes ASEAN’s role more important, not less. In the absence of credible multilateral mediation, regional tensions are more likely to spiral unchecked.
This is why self-restraint is urgently needed — especially from major powers such as Japan and China. Strategic signaling might serve domestic political purposes, but in a region where multiple flashpoints intersect, rhetorical escalation narrows diplomatic space and raises the risk of miscalculation. Without restraint, Japan-China tensions over Taiwan could easily spill over into economic retaliation, supply chain disruptions or even military incidents, with devastating consequences for East Asia as a whole.
In times like these, ASEAN’s limitations should not be an excuse for bypassing multilateralism, but a warning of what happens when it weakens. The organization might no longer possess the same diplomatic weight it once did, yet it remains one of the few platforms where rival powers can still meet without the immediate pressure to choose sides. Preserving that space requires not only institutional reform within ASEAN, but a conscious commitment by major powers to exercise restraint.
The stability of East Asia depends less on declarations of strength than on the willingness of all actors to manage their differences responsibly. As ASEAN struggles with its own internal challenges, the burden of preventing escalation falls even more heavily on Japan and China themselves. Without self-constraint, the region risks sliding from managed competition into a cycle of confrontation — one that neither ASEAN nor East Asia can afford.
Dion Maulana Prasetya is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang in Indonesia.
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