Australia has become the first country to ban children under 16 from using social media platforms, a milestone in the history of technology governance. For Gen Z, a social media and phone-based childhood has given rise to a host of issues that endanger their mental health and well-being: a silent “digital pandemic.”
The motivating factors behind the Australian ban align with the framework of “transmission mechanisms” I put forward in a recent paper published in the academic journal Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences. Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms trigger and amplify negative emotions such as anger, fear or jealousy in the modern attention economy, trapping young people in a bubble that perpetuates increased anxiety, depression and social polarization. Malicious users are able to create anonymous profiles to engage in cyberbullying, the promotion of extremist ideologies or even grooming — this poses a threat of a new form of harm.
The addictiveness of screens disrupts sleep, and often comes at the cost of exercise and face-to-face social interaction, impacting young people’s social-emotional learning and development of psychological resilience. Suicide is the second-leading cause of death for adolescents in Taiwan, yet only 20 percent of those suffering from anxiety or depression seek help — and the digital pandemic is undoubtedly making things worse.
Australia’s ban is an example of preventive governance — born not out of moral panic, but research — and is designed to address risks at their source. Taiwan faces a similar situation, yet actions to address the crises, which include Internet addiction, cyberbullying and AI-enabled face-swap porn, often stop at the level of public education and awareness. Policies that actually target these issues are disjointed, appearing, for example, in the Child and Juvenile Welfare and Rights Protection Act (兒童及少年福利與權益保障法) or the now-mothballed 2022 draft digital intermediary services act.
Our defense should have four central pillars. First, to regulate and enforce transparency requirements for algorithms while improving age-verification mechanisms for the underaged. Second, to strengthen filters and content guidelines to address issues of self-harm and mental health. Third, boost well-being and psychological resilience education, and provide support for digital parenting. Fourth, establish a network of support for the social media age as crisis intervention and suicide prevention measures, while increasing the number of counselors available to young people and the accessibility of anonymous online support services.
We must think transformatively and structurally rather than only in terms of bans and limits within existing frameworks. The Taiwanese Society of Psychiatry is currently rolling out its plan for the “digital transformation of psychiatry,” which includes digital screening, diagnostics and treatment, as well as ethics education measures.
Accessing help online and remotely can help with reducing stigma and increasing accessibility; it is already the norm in the US, but is still subject to legal restrictions in Taiwan.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Legislative Yuan should consider the US’ model and moderately relax restrictions to allow our mental healthcare systems to evolve with the world around us — particularly for the sake of young people.
Technology is a double-edged sword. Australia’s social media ban might be controversial, but it has certainly started the global discussion. The UK and Europe, which already have strong regulations, will be watching closely, while Denmark and Malaysia have already announced plans to follow Australia’s example.
Taiwan must keep up with the times and bring together the government, technology sector, experts, parents and caregivers to accelerate a digital transformation to address the youth mental health crisis. Let us create a safe and positive digital future for the next generation where technology can be a positive force for our well-being, rather than a source of psychological ills.
Su Kuan-Pin is a professor of psychiatry at China Medical University’s College of Medicine, the deputy superintendent of An-nan Hospital and a member of the Presidential Office’s Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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