This year marks 30 years of “unofficial” Taiwan-India relations, including the establishment of the India Taipei Association and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, which function as de facto embassies. Yet the milestone has passed largely unnoticed and without celebration.
The lack of attention is understandable, given how global focus has been dominated by the unpredictability and influence on regional politics of US President Donald Trump’s administration.
However, strategic realities cannot be ignored. Taiwan matters to India. It is not a peripheral concern. It is a matter of central strategic and economic importance, demanding recognition in India’s regional and global calculus.
Tensions between Japan and China illustrate the grave risks of ignoring Taiwan. Leaving it isolated, as Beijing desires, is no longer simply a choice — it is a surrender of space, agency and leverage in the face of coercion.
The warning signs are evident. An Indian woman from Arunachal Pradesh was detained and harassed at a Shanghai airport, targeted solely because China claims her home state as its territory. That was followed by a statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserting that China has never recognized Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing calls Zangnan.
India cannot afford passivity in its dealings with China. Yet, Indian policy has been excessively cautious, careful not to cross China’s so-called red lines even when doing so undermines its own strategic and economic priorities.
This is not about confrontation. It is about asserting India’s priorities, protecting its sovereignty, safeguarding strategic interests and recalibrating its regional posture. If India continues to approach Taiwan with excessive caution, it risks losing critical opportunities to bolster its position in Asia’s evolving balance of power.
There are encouraging signs. State-level engagement, particularly in southern India, where states enjoy greater autonomy, has produced positive results vis-a-vis commercial and technological collaboration with Taiwan.
However, beyond those pockets of progress, tangible outcomes remain limited.
Much more must be done, and quickly. Taiwan presents substantive opportunities. Advancing engagement is not only productive, it is necessary. Allowing China to coerce Taiwan while dismissing it as “not our business” is inconsistent with the strategic stature expected of a country such as India.
A recalibration of India’s Taiwan policy is overdue, starting with the recognition that Taiwan matters to India and that engagement should be purposeful, consistent and aligned with its broader strategic priorities.
Any discussion of Taiwan inevitably revolves around semiconductors. India sees Taiwan as a vital technology partner, and cooperation in the chip sector offers a critical pathway for economic growth, technological advancement and strategic autonomy. The Indian government has courted major Taiwanese firms for several years, but awareness and engagement must expand across institutions, industries and policymaking circles.
A promising initiative already exists in the joint master’s program in semiconductor technology between four Taiwanese universities and the Indian Institute of Science. The program boosts links between Indian academia and Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem. Indian engineers and technology professionals should be encouraged to participate, ensuring the transfer of expertise and know-how that India urgently needs.
Beyond education, India should consider establishing a Taiwan science park. A dedicated facility of that nature would attract Taiwanese companies, facilitate structured and long-term collaboration, and provide a visible symbol of India’s commitment to advancing its technological and industrial capacity in partnership with Taiwan.
India must shed unnecessary caution and adopt a more confident and consistent approach to Taiwan. Consultations and dialogue should be elevated. Where unofficial channels already exist, Indian officials beyond senior levels should participate. Ministries responsible for economics, technology and trade must engage, with meetings conducted at least at the deputy minister level to ensure sustained and effective engagement. Parliamentary channels must be leveraged to advance Indian interests.
A dedicated parliamentary committee on Taiwan-India relations could provide continuity, oversight and strategic direction, ensuring that engagement is deliberate and long-term rather than ad hoc and reactive.
India’s decision to stop sending officials to Taiwan for language training was shortsighted. Reinstating such programs would equip officials with a nuanced understanding of regional dynamics, enabling better policymaking and operational preparedness. Semiofficial exchanges do not violate any international norms and are essential for developing a cadre of informed officials.
Although Taiwan was never formally part of India’s “one China” policy, New Delhi should move beyond it entirely. It is not about Taiwan; it is about asserting India’s own territorial integrity, sovereignty and strategic independence.
India must confront a fundamental question: Will it continue to allow China to dictate the terms of engagement, even after repeatedly dismissing India’s concerns, interests and sovereignty?
The argument that New Delhi must avoid provoking Beijing has grown tired, outdated and counterproductive. Taiwan-India relations cannot be governed by fear. If India aspires to be a great power, it must act like one, asserting its interests boldly, consistently and without hesitation.
Yet, for now, this year might be remembered as a year of negligence and missed opportunities. India has been too occupied with caution, too hesitant to act and too restrained to mark a milestone that should have been celebrated.
Most disappointingly, the anniversary of 30 years of engagement with a strategically vital partner has gone largely unacknowledged.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed in this article are her own.
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