Super Typhoon Ragasa struck Taiwan with torrential rain on Tuesday, with Hualien and Taitung counties bearing the brunt of the storm. Disaster ensued when the downpours caused the Mataian River (馬太鞍溪) barrier lake to burst, causing muddy water and debris to flood Hualien County’s Guangfu Township (光復). Reports indicate that at least 15 people have been confirmed dead and dozens more are missing.
However, Super Typhoon Ragasa is not the only natural disaster to have hit this year. An earthquake measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale struck Chiayi County’s Dapu Township (大埔) in January, the hardest-hit areas being Tainan’s Nansi (楠西), Yujing (玉井) and Dongshan (東山) districts. In early July, Typhoon Danas devastated areas in Tainan’s Cigu District (七股) and Sibei Township (溪北). Heavy rain in late July caused extensive damage across central and southern Taiwan. On Aug. 13, Typhoon Podul hit, resulting in massive agricultural losses in Taitung County.
Given the frequent natural disasters this year, it is imperative that the government establish a dedicated disaster prevention agency.
The primary issue lies in the lack of a unified authority focused on disaster prevention.
Following the 921 Earthquake in 1999, the Executive Yuan established the 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission. After the Aug. 8, 2009, floods caused by Typhoon Morakot, the Executive Yuan established the Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council. However, both were ad hoc committees that were disbanded upon the conclusion of reconstruction efforts.
In the wake of Typhoon Danas, the subsequent heavy rains and Typhoon Podul, the Public Construction Commission was tasked with coordinating and implementing post-disaster reconstruction projects, but disaster prevention is ultimately not the commission’s core responsibility. In addition to the difficulty — or even impossibility — of unifying authority, it is also difficult to pass on or sustain disaster prevention experience, which has led to two issues:
The first is that disaster prevention resources are difficult to integrate. Disaster prevention resources are scattered across departments and ministries — without a lead authority, it is hard to consolidate them. Although Article 4 of the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act (災害防救法) clearly designates the Ministry of the Interior as the central regulating authority, Article 3 outlines that the prevention, response and recovery for disasters fall under the jurisdiction of different agencies depending on the nature of the disaster.
As a result, matters such as mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery for major disasters must be re-prepared or re-coordinated — either by the same or by different ministries — before, during and after each disaster, making it difficult to achieve success in a single try. After each major disaster, the Legislative Yuan often has to pass a new special bill to provide a legal basis for reconstruction or recovery efforts, thereby neglecting sustainable disaster prevention measures throughout the post-disaster recovery process. Under the current system, it is not possible to achieve long-term functionality.
The second issue stems from difficulties in inter-agency coordination, a challenge that is exacerbated by the same problems.
The government and civil society possess ample disaster prevention resources, but the absence of a dedicated and centralized disaster prevention agency is a key reason for the lack of effective integration. By contrast, the responsibilities for disaster response and relief are relatively unified. During disaster response efforts, it is common to see the president or premier at the emergency response center.
While there is a dedicated disaster response agency — the National Fire Agency — there is no dedicated agency for disaster prevention. Japan’s Cabinet Office, for example, has a minister of state for disaster management, under whom are departments dedicated to issues such as disaster planning, emergency response, information and alert systems, and international cooperation. In 2001, Japan consolidated its 22 ministries and agencies down to 12, and the disaster management minister and other disaster prevention organizations came as part of that reorganization.
After a landslide caused by Typhoon Morakot wiped out Kaohsiung’s Siaolin Village (小林), the Executive Yuan established a new disaster prevention and protection office. However, because it functions only as an advisory office with limited personnel, it lacks the capacity to serve as an integrated command center — unlike the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency under the Ministry of National Defense, which could play an integrated role before and after wartime disasters.
Although most municipalities and city or county governments have since established their own disaster prevention and protection offices — and many townships and district offices now have civil affairs disaster prevention divisions — such measures still fall short compared with more advanced nations such as the US, Japan and Australia, where dedicated disaster management agencies exist at both the central and local levels of government.
To respond to the increasing number of disasters caused by climate change, the time has come for Taiwan to establish its own dedicated disaster prevention agency.
Yang Yung-nane is a professor of political science at National Cheng Kung University and an adviser to the Tainan City Government’s disaster prevention advisory committee.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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