There are multiple competing theories about what drives the anti-green policies embraced by US President Donald Trump. Perhaps they reflect the influence of carbon-heavy industries in Republican-controlled states. Or perhaps they channel ideological hostility to the notion that the state should play any kind of planning role in the economy.
Whatever the case, it is increasingly apparent that the Trump administration wants to halt decarbonization not only in the US, but globally. Viewed from this perspective, much of the recent US policy incoherence starts to make more sense — albeit in a dangerously regressive way.
The US sits atop vast reserves of fossil fuels, which have underpinned its national prosperity for decades. They have lit cities, powered factories, stimulated postwar job growth and forged broad regional political coalitions among labor, agriculture and corporations. They are also highly profitable commodities, with exports creating global dependence on US supplies (which is especially true for liquefied natural gas [LNG] following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine). Fossil fuels are a core component of the country’s political economy — and a key factor in US domestic and foreign policymaking.
The Trump administration recognizes this. It includes ideological realists who understand that energy transitions make hegemons — that energy is power. Just as coal drove the industrial revolution in England, oil and gas fueled the US’ postwar dominance. Whoever controls energy controls the future.
Unfortunately for the US, if the next energy transition is a green one, the future surely belongs to China, whose green tech dominance is so firmly established that it does not really matter which metric you look at. In terms of the critical minerals used for such technologies, China supplies the majority of the world’s refined lithium (70 percent), cobalt (78 percent), graphite (95 percent), rare earths (91 percent) and manganese (91 percent). In terms of green tech manufacturing, China accounts for 80 percent of solar panel production, 50 percent to 70 percent of the wind turbine market and more than half of electric vehicles. And in terms of deployment, it is undertaking three-quarters of the world’s renewable energy projects.
This is all good news for those who care about decarbonization; but it is bad news for those hoping to extend US hegemony. If the US wants to preserve its global primacy, then realist logic dictates that it needs China to fail. And the US could engineer that outcome by continuing to do exactly what it is doing.
Since Trump returned to office, his administration has been reshaping US consumption by imposing massive import tariffs and abandoning the previous administration’s program of domestic decarbonization incentives and investments. The Inflation Reduction Act was an explicit attempt to compete with China in green tech. However, now Americans are being weaned off the renewables that they were just beginning to enjoy.
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill spells disaster for the future of US green tech investment, and his administration is further deregulating fossil fuels and adding more hurdles for clean energy projects. While the US Environmental Protection Agency works to extinguish its own ability to regulate carbon emissions, NASA satellites that track US emissions are being targeted for self-destruction. All these moves, coupled with 30 percent tariffs on imports from China, signal to green tech producers that the world’s top consumer no longer wants their wares.
Moreover, the US is trying to undercut global demand for Chinese green tech by compelling its largest trading partners to import US fossil fuels instead. China’s own top trading partner, the EU, just committed to purchase US$750 billion of US oil and gas by 2028 — an amount that far exceeds current US output. And the rest of China’s top trading partners are following suit. Japan and Taiwan have agreed to invest billions in US LNG, and South Korea is poised to join them.
These moves come straight from the US postwar playbook: By ensuring that European markets would be dependent on US oil, the Marshall Plan prevented the Soviet Union from wielding its own energy influence over the continent.
The US government is not just trying to rebalance trade. It is obstructing global decarbonization as a matter of policy. Cratering US demand for green technologies decreases global demand by a non-trivial amount. And manipulating the terms of bilateral trade deals to favor US fossil fuels abroad further undercuts demand for green tech, impeding the clean energy transition in key blocs such as the EU and East Asia.
The Trump administration is doing everything it can to ensure that fossil fuels remain dominant in the energy mix of the 21st century. If it succeeds, the short-term returns to the US would be huge. However, the long-term damage to the planet would be orders of magnitude larger.
Mark Blyth, professor of international economics at Brown University, is the coauthor (with Nicolo Fraccaroli) of Inflation: A Guide for Users and Losers. Daniel Driscoll is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Virginia and a nonresident fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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