The Russia-India-China alliance, floated in the 1990s as a counterweight to the US, is being revived today as a way for the three countries to ride out the storm of US President Donald Trump’s trade war. However, old suspicions mean the union is unlikely to endure. Despite their shared grievances with Washington, the partnership is more a marriage of convenience.
That reality would be on display this week when the three nuclear powers converge in Tianjin, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. The Kremlin is pressing for a long-awaited trilateral meeting. If the troika did find new life, it would send a powerful signal that the geopolitical heavyweights are aligning in the face of US pressure. However, the inherent tensions between India and China, and economic differences between the three, make that outcome unlikely.
That pressure is most acute for India. Until recently a key US partner, it has borne the brunt of Trump’s tariffs. He doubled duties on exports to 50 percent — which went into effect on Wednesday — as punishment for its purchases of Russian oil.
Illustration: Tania Chou
Beijing, originally Washington’s primary target, is enjoying a temporary reprieve, but is stuck in a long-term strategic competition. And Russia, battered by sanctions and bogged down in Ukraine, is on the hunt for friends to blunt its isolation.
Moscow first dreamed up the idea of Russia-India-China (RIC), as it was dubbed, in the 1990s. Then-Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed the formation of the group to challenge the US’ global influence. The coalition looked formidable on paper — three nations with huge economies and populations. In practice, it has always been undermined by mistrust, above all between rivals India and China.
Among the biggest sticking points is their long-running border dispute. They have been at loggerheads over an ill-defined 3,488km frontier in the Himalayan region. Those hostilities erupted into a war in 1962, and continue to simmer today. In 2020, the two clashed violently in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, leaving soldiers dead on both sides in the bloodiest fighting in decades. Diplomatic ties froze, with New Delhi suspending tourist visas for Chinese nationals and imposing restrictions on tech imports.
Trump’s tariffs are nudging them closer. Last week, they agreed to explore demarcating their disputed border, a key move toward resolving the territorial dispute. Strains around visas have eased, and China has expressed solidarity with India on exports.
However, the risk of future standoffs cannot be discounted. The fundamental contradictions in the dynamic are unlikely to disappear soon, Council for Strategic and Defense Research founder and director Happymon Jacob wrote in the Hindustan Times. While serious violence might have been averted for now, a lasting rapprochement is unlikely. It is hard for New Delhi to be fully confident of Beijing’s intentions, especially in light of its military assertiveness in areas such as the South China Sea and Taiwan.
China is also far too close to Pakistan for India’s comfort. Beijing has become Islamabad’s most important defense partner since the end of the Cold War.
During a clash with India in May, Pakistan claimed Chinese-made J-10C jets were used to shoot down five Indian fighter jets during the conflict.
New Delhi said China also provided its rival with air defense and satellite support. This alignment deepens India’s security anxieties and reinforces the sense that China cannot be trusted.
Setting security aside, the economic logic does not work in New Delhi’s favor. India depends on US technology, capital and supply chains — which neither Russia nor China could replace. The US is also the most important market for Indian goods, by a wide margin.
Consumers last year bought US$77.5 billion worth of Indian goods, according to a Bank of Baroda report. In comparison, Chinese and Russian purchases were only a fraction of that.
In contrast, Moscow is much closer to Beijing. Since Western sanctions were imposed in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, bilateral trade between the two has surged to record highs, surpassing US$200 billion last year. Businesses are increasingly connected to the Chinese financial system through the use of the yuan and services such as UnionPay cards. For New Delhi, joining such a bloc would mean being the junior partner — hardly an appealing prospect.
That has not stopped Moscow from trying to rejuvenate it.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov in May said that “the time has come for the revival” of the troika. Beijing has also backed the initiative, saying it could uphold peace, security and stability in the world.
Resurrecting the bloc could pose a challenge to the US if it resulted in more coordinated action. However, what binds these nations is necessity, not trust. The gathering in Tianjin would offer the opportunity for the optics of warmer ties, but it would be more symbolism than substance. This is an inherently fragile partnership, one that could unravel if US pressure diminishes.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades.
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