Christian Whiton’s recent article, “What Taiwan Should Do,” published on Domino Theory as a follow-up to his “How Taiwan Lost Trump,” presents an impressively broad collection of proposals for strengthening Taiwan’s military, economy, identity and international alliances. The scope alone makes it stand out.
In a single piece, Whiton ranges from drone-centric warfare to national symbolism, and from financial deregulation to joint Pacific military planning. Such breadth is valuable because it invites Taiwan to think beyond incrementalism and to approach its defense and resilience in an integrated fashion.
Yet the vision requires careful parsing before adoption. The first concern is that the China factor feels significantly underweighted.
For Beijing, certain steps Whiton suggests — such as formally adopting an Israel-style self-defense doctrine, removing Republic of China symbols and building structures akin to a “Pacific NATO” — would not be seen as policy tweaks but as accelerants to confrontation.
These could shorten China’s timeline for coercion or even force. Likewise, opening Taiwan’s financial system to foreign capital, including limited People’s Republic of China investment, would be far riskier in practice than it appears on paper. Beijing has decades of experience disguising ownership and influence through layers of intermediaries, and such channels could be exploited for infiltration.
A second caveat regards Taiwan’s politics and society.
Some proposals — such as liberalizing gun laws for militias or dismantling historic symbols — would be deeply divisive. In a democracy as competitive as Taiwan’s, major initiatives that split public opinion risk weakening unity precisely when resilience depends on it. Whiton’s list does not address how such measures could be built on a broad political consensus, which is essential for enduring policy.
The third limitation is sequencing. The article places short-term, low-cost measures alongside decade-long transformations, without a hierarchy or clear path from one to the other.
For example, clarifying Taiwan’s defense messaging or streamlining visas for allied nationals could be enacted in months. By contrast, developing an independent satellite network or pegging the currency to the US dollar would take years of preparation and sustained political will.
Without a clear order of operations, Taiwan risks pursuing too much at once or attempting high-risk, high-provocation moves before the foundations are ready.
None of these caveats should detract from Whiton’s vision being worth taking seriously. The challenge is to transform a rich idea collection into a coherent, survivable strategy. That starts with prioritizing low-provocation, high-impact actions that can be implemented quickly — such as improving asymmetric capabilities, hardening infrastructure and finding low-key entry points for deeper military cooperation with allies. These build deterrence while buying time for more ambitious, symbolic or divisive reforms.
Equally important is adopting guiding rules for pursuing bigger initiatives. Quiet preparation should precede public declaration for measures likely to provoke Beijing. Civil resilience should be layered into military strength — stockpiles, medical readiness and information integrity — so that Taiwan can sustain itself in a prolonged crisis. When opening economic or social channels, particularly to foreign investment or migration, Taiwan must first put in place robust vetting and counterinfiltration safeguards.
Whiton’s article is not a blueprint, but it could be a starting point for one. The key is to blend ambition with discipline: to aim high, but move in steps that strengthen Taiwan’s position before inviting the next test.
John Cheng is a retired businessman from Hong Kong now living in Taiwan.
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