The past year has been marked by a series of revolutions and political shocks as young people across Asia and Africa have taken to the streets, demanding accountable governments, fairer societies and economic opportunities — a wave of resistance that Open Society Foundations president Binaifer Nowrojee has aptly termed “youthquakes.”
The most dramatic upheaval took place in Bangladesh, where anger over politicized public-sector job quotas escalated into a nationwide movement to topple former Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, leading to the fall of Asia’s “Iron Lady.”
While some celebrated Hasina’s ouster as a brave stand against authoritarianism, many international observers viewed it as the beginning of a turbulent and uncertain period. Some raised concerns about the threat of Muslim violence and heightened geopolitical tensions. Others attributed the uprising to public frustration with neoliberal reforms promoted by the IMF. Economist Jeffrey Sachs went further, dismissing the revolution as US backed regime change.
However, these interpretations overlook the enormous potential of a bottom-up, youth-led revolution. Despite facing powerful global headwinds, Bangladesh’s youth movement has continued to gain strength in the year since Hasina’s fall. Consequently, what began as street protests against corrupt and anti-democratic practices has evolved into a broader campaign for structural reform.
YOUTH MOVEMENT
In the year since the revolution, youth activists have not only helped sustain the interim administration, but have also laid the groundwork for a transition to electoral democracy. While the road ahead remains fraught with challenges, five key developments offer grounds for hope.
First, youth activism has catalyzed the emergence of new civil-society platforms that have encouraged non-political elites to participate in critical public dialogues. Since August last year, new grassroots initiatives and professionalized nongovernmental organizations have triggered a surge in civic engagement, fueling community-led conversations on how to confront discrimination, address systemic inequities and advance essential pre-election reforms.
Second, the youth movement has made significant institutional gains. Young organizers have mobilized support for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus’ interim government, helping to extend his mandate, and secure domestic and international support for his election roadmap. They have also pushed major parties to support the formation of a National Consensus Commission tasked with advancing reform discussions in five areas: the constitution, the judiciary, the electoral system, public administration and anti-corruption.
Third, in addition to fueling demand for institutional reform, young activists have taken a bold step into formal politics by launching the National Citizen Party (NCP) — Bangladesh’s first student-led political party. Once officially registered, the NCP aims to provide young voters with a viable alternative to traditional parties ahead of the anticipated election in early next year.
Fourth, Bangladeshi youth are harnessing the energy of street protests to reshape the country’s political culture. For example, they are calling for lowering the voting age to 16 and promoting transparent, crowd-funded election financing instead of opaque or illicit political donations.
Lastly, strategic engagement with political elites has already delivered tangible results. Relentless campaigns by emerging youth and civic groups have brought together all major political parties to deliberate on a sweeping set of 166 reforms. Following months-long negotiations, the National Consensus Commission is expected to release a manifesto — the much anticipated July Charter — a formal document listing agreed-upon fundamental constitutional and governance reforms and commitments on future implementation. These include term limits for the prime minister, the establishment of a bicameral parliament with proportional representation, judicial and police independence, stronger opposition rights, mandatory legislative review of international treaties, and new mechanisms for public accountability, such as referendums and anti-corruption oversight.
Still, while the past year has shown that tech-savvy, cross-class youth coalitions can outmaneuver entrenched patron-client politics, the initial optimism might prove short-lived. Crucially, major fault lines could cause the Bangladeshi revolution to end like the short-lived Arab Spring of the early 2010s.
The NCP’s growing credibility issues are a warning sign. With two members in government, it is considered a king’s party. Although it is still awaiting registration, the party is already facing corruption allegations, including accusations of institutionalizing mob justice and exploiting privileged access to public institutions for political gain. Violent clashes with political opponents have further damaged its reputation.
RISKS
At the same time, growing dissatisfaction could undermine the interim government’s efforts to extend its tenure. Last month, the Bangladeshi government’s mishandling of a fighter-jet crash exposed persistent coordination failures within Yunus’ Cabinet. While the long-delayed trial of Hasina began this month — in absentia — human-rights organizations have raised concerns about the government’s use of arbitrary detention to target perceived political opponents.
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s political future hinges on the interim government’s ability to deliver a fair, clean and violence-free national election in early next year. The problem is that the once-united youth-led coalition that toppled Hasina’s regime appears increasingly fragile and divided.
The NCP’s youth leadership must recognize that meaningful policy change is a long-term process that would extend well beyond the next election. With the NCP and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party locked in a standoff over the pace of reforms, the country risks falling into its own version of the prisoner’s dilemma: Unless they cooperate, both stand to lose.
To ensure that reform efforts yield more than a symbolic “one-day democracy,” Bangladesh’s youth leaders must prioritize dialogue over confrontation and work to resolve disagreements over timing and implementation. Continued insistence on an all-at-once approach risks derailing progress and pulling the country back into a cycle of instability and repression, jeopardizing Bangladesh’s future after its upcoming graduation from “least developed country” status. It could also allow Hasina’s Awami League to remobilize and re-enter the electoral arena — an outcome that might align with the unspoken interests of a section of the military elite.
Regardless of the next election’s outcome, the fall of Hasina has irreversibly transformed Bangladesh’s political landscape. Having sparked a nationwide movement for structural reform, the country’s youth are now firmly rooted in the political transition they initiated. However, as they are discovering, toppling a repressive regime is far easier than building a better one.
M. Niaz Asadullah, head of the Southeast Asia cluster of the Global Labor Organization, is a visiting professor of economics at the University of Reading and a professorial fellow at North South University in Bangladesh.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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