Houston First Corp, a company operated by Houston, Texas, has contacted the Taiwanese government regarding the possibility of cooperating on suborbital commercial spaceflight, the company said on Sunday. The city is home to the Houston Spaceport, a federally licensed commercial facility for launching and landing suborbital vehicles, which the company said could reduce travel between Houston and Taiwan from more than 13 hours to as little as two. A planned national space mission launch facility in Jiupeng Village (九棚) in Pingtung County’s Manjhou Township (滿州) could be developed into a spaceport, a source said.
However, suborbital passenger flights remain prohibitively expensive with current technology and passenger travel faces severe challenges related to the physical strain of launch and re-entry, the source said. As a result, initial applications would likely focus on cargo.
In the near term, collaboration between Taiwanese and American researchers could begin at Jiupeng with materials and equipment testing. They could also assess how materials withstand the extreme heat of atmospheric re-entry. Data gathered near the edge of space would be valuable to aerospace engineers and meteorologists. Suborbital flights could be used to test satellites, sensors and components in space-like conditions. Such capabilities would give Taiwan a strategic edge in the emerging aerospace industry, helping to diversify its economy beyond its heavy reliance on semiconductor exports.
Expanding Taiwan’s aerospace sector would also bring significant national security benefits. One growing concern is the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea communication cables, which have already been disrupted on several occasions. To mitigate that risk, the government has expressed interest in building a satellite-based Internet network. More critically, suborbital flight could enable the rapid deployment of troops and military equipment from the US or other friendly countries in the event of an attempted Chinese invasion. While any spaceport would likely become a target in such a scenario, the speed of suborbital flight makes pre-emptive deployment possible during the initial phase of a crisis.
Analysts have said that China would seek to capture Taiwan swiftly and decisively, aiming to present the world with a fait accompli that discourages foreign intervention. However, the rapid positioning of foreign forces in Taiwan could give Beijing pause, as it would raise the risk of direct conflict with another country.
In a broader sense, establishing an aerospace research hub in Taiwan — particularly one involving foreign resident researchers — would raise the country’s international profile, just as semiconductors have. Increased international visibility would make Taiwan a more difficult target for annexation or blockade. If the site at Jiupeng eventually grows into a spaceport, Taiwan could emerge as a key regional hub for next-generation aviation.
After taking office in May 2016, former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) included aerospace and defense among the pillars of her “five plus two” innovative industries plan, aiming to harness government support to drive private-sector momentum. Alongside semiconductors and artificial intelligence, the aerospace sector is becoming increasingly critical, economically and militarily. As countries race for dominance in the information domain, aerospace technologies would be vital for achieving air superiority and intelligence gathering. That is why China has heavily invested in systems such as the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.
Taiwan must continue to advance its aerospace capabilities, especially in the face of growing threats to its sovereignty. Partnering with Houston — a global center for human spaceflight and related industries — is an opportunity Taiwan cannot afford to miss.
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