Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reshaped the global security landscape, with consequences that extend beyond Europe to countries like India, which has long pursued strategic autonomy and multialignment. Moscow’s deepening dependence on Beijing, economically, militarily and diplomatically, is accelerating the formation of a destabilizing Russia–China axis. The convergence of these two revisionist powers poses a systemic challenge with implications reaching from Europe to the Indo-Pacific.
For India, this shift calls for a foreign policy recalibration, especially in its still-underdeveloped ties with central and eastern European (CEE) countries that are on the front lines of resisting Russian aggression.
India’s relationship with Russia has long been anchored in decades of defense cooperation. However, past alignments do not guarantee future convergence. The war in Ukraine has exposed the erosion of Moscow’s autonomy and its increasing dependence on Beijing. Russia’s growing synergy with China, particularly within forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, increasingly runs counter to Indian interests, even as its military-industrial collaboration strengthens China’s defense capabilities.
For India, this evolving partnership is deeply troubling. China remains its most pressing strategic adversary, evident in persistent border tensions, maritime assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region and unflinching support for Pakistan. Russia’s parallel outreach to Islamabad only adds to the unease, casting further doubt on Moscow’s neutrality in future crises. The long-held view of Russia as a benign presence in India’s strategic calculus is steadily eroding among policymakers and the strategic community.
Seen plainly, the Russia-China partnership represents a revisionist alliance, one that seeks to reshape global norms in ways that challenge the principles central to India’s worldview: sovereignty, multipolarity and regional stability.
While India has cultivated deep ties with western Europe, its engagement with CEE remains limited in both scope and ambition. Yet, countries along NATO’s eastern flank are demonstrating growing geopolitical agency through their assertive responses to Russian aggression. Poland stands out, investing heavily in defense modernization, cyberresilience and emerging technologies, sectors where India is also seeking strategic partnerships. Poland’s resolute posture, in contrast to the caution of some larger European powers, mirrors India’s own emphasis on strategic autonomy.
CEE countries and India share a common interest in safeguarding sovereignty and reducing dependence on Russia and China. Many of these states are reassessing their ties with Beijing even as they confront Moscow’s threats. At the same time, the US, particularly under President Donald Trump, is proving to be an uncertain partner, complicating the prospects for long-term resolution of the war in Ukraine. In this evolving landscape, India offers itself as a stable, democratic partner with shared values, mutual concerns and a commitment to strategic self-reliance.
For India-CEE relations to reach their potential, countries like Poland must also look beyond the confines of Europe. A sharper Indo-Pacific focus would acknowledge the interconnected nature of global security and deepen alignment with India’s strategic outlook.
The Russia-China alignment presents a shared strategic challenge that demands coordinated responses from India and the CEE. As global theaters increasingly overlap, the once-clear divide between European and Indo-Pacific security is fading. China’s support for Russia has prolonged the war in Ukraine and helped Moscow withstand Western sanctions. Its access to Russian defense technology is also reshaping regional power balances.
A crisis in the Taiwan Strait, where China might rely on Russian diplomatic backing, if not overt support, would inevitably have global repercussions beyond Asia. For CEE countries, especially those aiming to mitigate systemic risks, Taiwan’s security is not a distant concern, but an integral part of the wider framework of global interdependence and resilience.
These are compelling reasons for India and the CEE states to deepen their strategic engagement. India is increasingly seen in Europe as a constructive and reliable partner. Strengthening ties with CEE countries would not only diversify India’s defense and trade relationships, but also enhance its diplomatic leverage in a fragmented global order. The goodwill is already present, backed by historical ties, high-level visits and the recent opening of an Indian mission in Vilnius.
However, this engagement must evolve from symbolic gestures to structured cooperation. India should consider launching a dedicated India-CEE platform focused on strategic and technological collaboration. Further institutionalizing the relationship through regular dialogue and joint initiatives would build trust and operational depth.
India and the CEE might not align on every issue, but their shared commitment to sovereignty, democracy and regional stability provides a strong foundation. In a world challenged by revisionist powers and weakening multilateral norms, practical cooperation in cyberdefense, critical infrastructure and supply chain resilience could serve bilateral interests and broader strategic goals.
It is time to move beyond rhetorical affirmations. A sustained engagement framework, anchored in defense collaboration, technology exchanges and joint responses to shared threats, would deliver tangible outcomes and lasting value. For India, deeper ties with the CEE must become a strategic priority, not just an afterthought. For the CEE, India could prove a vital partner in countering the growing Russia-China nexus and bolstering resilience from Europe to the Indo-Pacific — Taiwan included.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation.
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