Taiwan’s legalization of same-sex marriage in 2019 has reinforced its reputation as a beacon of progressive values in Asia. There has been much discourse on the progress of Taiwan’s LGBT movement, yet there has been little discussion about how Taiwan could leverage that to enhance its soft power, particularly in Southeast Asia.
Constrained by limited diplomatic recognition and political capital, Taiwan should carve new avenues for engagement with the region. Promoting LGBT diplomacy as niche diplomacy is a cost-effective way to enhance Taiwan’s visibility and widen its reach. LGBT diplomacy also complements President William Lai’s (賴清德) New Southbound Policy Plus (NSP+) by bringing the people-centered pillar to the fore, thereby adding substance to Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asian partners.
Bringing LGBT diplomacy into the NSP+ is more than a matter of values — it is also a strategic move. At a time when China is tightening its grip on civil society and suppressing LGBT rights, including the closure of the Beijing LGBT Center, Taiwan has a chance to draw a sharp contrast. While Beijing leans on repression, Taipei can lead with inclusion, using rights-based diplomacy to carve out moral and political space in the region. Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asian partners through LGBT diplomacy should be a careful approach of showcasing itself as the defender of LGBT rights, promoting values-based diplomacy, and demonstrating how a democracy can offer values and tangible benefits for the community.
Moreover, LGBT diplomacy is in tune with Lai’s “Shin-Lai” (Trustworthy) diplomacy, which focuses on universal and liberal values. By prioritizing LGBT rights, Taiwan can position itself as a normative power, and reinforce its image as a collaborative and trustworthy partner in the eyes of Southeast Asian youth and civil society.
If Taiwan wants its LGBT-oriented foreign policy to make a real impact, it would need more than good intentions — it needs robust diplomatic and institutional backing. Just as the government has made strides at home, it should bring the same level of commitment to the international stage, particularly amid the resurgence of conservative, anti-LGBT movements around the world.
Despite Southeast Asia’s conservative social fabric and contested legal frameworks for LGBT rights promotion, the region has seen steady progress in advancing those rights. Thailand’s recognition of same-sex marriage in January suggests a significant breakthrough in a region where social acceptance often lags behind the law. Vietnam, which decriminalized same-sex unions in 2014, has since made real efforts to raise public awareness and reduce prejudice against LGBT people. In the Philippines and Singapore, social support and LGBT activism have become more visible, even if legal protections have not fully caught up.
Against this backdrop, there is a special opportunity for Taiwan, which has been at the forefront of LGBT advocacy and rights promotion in Asia, to collaborate with its Southeast Asian partners. Taiwan has much to share about civic involvement, educational reform and legal protections. Vietnam’s schools are becoming more tolerant of gender diversity, but frequently lack the resources and tools to provide inclusive curricula based on “gender equity education.” This might be modeled after Taiwan’s Gender Equality Education Act (性別平等教育法).
Distributing financial resources to LGBT organizations can help Taiwan expand its foothold in other countries. With the funding, Southeast Asian LGBT rights groups can engage in gender equality events and discussions with global partners, and enhance local advocacy for equality and inclusion through participation in international fora.
The US’ foreign aid freeze and dismantling of the US Agency for International Development has left many Southeast Asian LGBT organizations without critical funding and diplomatic support. Taiwan should step in to fill this void. Such support would not only address structural resource gaps faced by LGBT groups, but would also foster long-term partnerships based on values-based recognition and promotion. Taiwan’s civil society support could be broadened to include LGBT-focused initiatives abroad.
In the private sector, Taiwanese enterprises in Southeast Asia — such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co and Formosa Plastics — should be encouraged to embrace LGBT-inclusive policies, including nondiscrimination clauses and equal diversity training. These initiatives work well with global environmental, social and governance standards, particularly the principles of diversity, equity and inclusion. By fostering an inclusive, fair and respectful workplace environment, employees would remain positive and productive, and the same work culture could be promoted in other countries.
Finally, Taiwan’s quiet, community-oriented engagement — rather than ideological advocacy — facilitates better relations with regional LGBT communities and helps alleviate apprehension in politically diverse Southeast Asia. By supporting grassroots LGBT activism, promoting knowledge exchange and sharing its experience in advancing LGBT rights, Taiwan can enhance trust and solidarity with Southeast Asia’s LGBT communities. The most effective way to bring partners together is through the exchange of not just ideals and values, but also ideas and concrete strategies.
LGBT diplomacy would not be without challenges. The political heterogeneity of Southeast Asia — from Thailand’s progressive changes to Brunei’s stringent anti-LGBT legislation — demands that Taiwan customize its strategy. Open advocacy could provoke displeasure in conservative states, so it should focus on grassroots engagement rather than top-down rhetoric.
Taiwan’s lack of official diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian partners would also likely impede its soft power. It would be important to collaborate with non-state entities, such as non-governmental organizations and corporations. China’s regional hegemony and coercion presents an additional obstacle. It is plausible that Beijing would call Taipei’s LGBT diplomacy ideological intrusion and use its influence to coerce Southeast Asian states. Taiwan could address this by highlighting shared values and mutual benefits, framing LGBT diplomacy as a collaborative initiative. Taiwan could share its legal expertise and experience in advancing LGBT rights with Southeast Asian countries that are making progress toward gender equality, such as Thailand and Vietnam, particularly on the removal of legal constraints on same-sex relationships. In engaging with hidebound states, Taipei should adopt a pragmatic approach, underlining the economic benefits associated with LGBT-friendly policies to promote gradual policy changes.
As Taiwan looks to boost its engagement in Southeast Asia through the NSP+, LGBT diplomacy offers a compelling avenue to innovate soft power and reinforce people-to-people ties. In the long run, a diplomatic maneuver in this special policy area would reinforce Taiwan’s identity as a progressive democracy — one that stands in sharp contrast to China’s assertive authoritarianism. From civil society partnerships to business engagement and grassroots initiatives, LGBT diplomacy — a potential defining feature of Taiwan’s foreign policy strategy — offers Taiwan ample room to bolster ties with Southeast Asian states.
Huynh Tam Sang is a Young Leaders Program member of the Pacific Forum, a research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation, founder and editor-in-chief of the Vietnam Strategic Forum, and a doctoral student at National Tsing Hua University. Phan Van Tim (Tim Phan) is the columnist for the Vietnam Strategic Forum. He writes on Taiwan’s foreign relations and LGBT issues, particularly those relating to Taiwan and Vietnam.
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