In the Philippines, a handful of entrenched families shape public power, from the presidency down to the barangays, the most local level of government. Yesterday voters were once again confronted with a host of recognizable names on the ballot for the midterm elections. The result is a democracy built on inherited privilege, not merit.
The race is being viewed as a dress rehearsal for the 2028 presidential contest — and a proxy war between two of the nation’s most powerful clans: the Marcoses and the Dutertes. Along with the Aquinos and the Macapagal-Arroyos, these dynasties have ruled the country since 2001.
The archipelago transitioned from authoritarian rule in 1986 with the overthrow of then-president Ferdinand Marcos, but the system still heavily favors political and economic elites. Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr is the former president’s son. His sister is a senator, and his cousin serves as speaker of the House of Representatives.
Marcos Jr’s estranged vice president, Sara Duterte, belongs to another influential dynasty. The Duterte camp is positioning her as the next leader, despite an impeachment trial for an alleged death threat against the president, which is due to start in July.
She has denied the accusations. Her father, former president Rodrigo Duterte, is eyeing a return as Davao City mayor, even while awaiting trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague for alleged crimes against humanity committed during his deadly war on drugs. His lawyers have asked the ICC’s pre-trial chamber to nullify his case and order his release.
A recent report from the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP) found that more than half of the district representatives seeking re-election belong to dynasties, and at least 87 percent of provincial governments are led by members of established clans.
When a political system is hijacked like this, it destroys democratic opportunities for ordinary Filipinos, said Mong Palatino, a former legislator in the left-leaning Kabataan party.
“It’s not beneficial for citizens to choose candidates between two or three families. They crowd out new names because they have consolidated their power,” he added.
There are about two dozen political dynasties seeking to occupy at least five seats each in this election, the ICHRP report said. Local politics often serves as the launchpad for national dominance, and this year’s candidate list reads like a family tree: the Villars in Las Pinas, the Singsons in Ilocos Sur and the Revillas in Cavite, among others.
The Dutertes’ ascendance as one of the country’s most powerful political families began with their unbroken control of Davao City Hall for more than two decades, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism said.
At least 113 out of 149 city mayors belong to political dynasties, it added.
This is a historical problem, with roots going back hundreds of years to colonial times, when landowners emerged as power brokers, but it is getting worse. As of August last year, close to 80 percent of the country’s lawmakers belong to these groups.
The Philippines is not alone in having families dominate public life. India, Indonesia and Japan have also seen their share, as have Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. However, this kind of nepotism can deepen economic inequality, further dampening prospects for citizens, as well as damaging democratic representation and political diversity.
There are already mechanisms in place to curtail the influence of clans in the Philippines, but they have yet to be implemented. The 1987 Philippine Constitution calls for a ban on political dynasties. Legislators should urgently pass the enabling law to enforce this.
The law should clearly define what a “political dynasty” is and ban immediate family members from simultaneously or successively holding elective positions within a certain jurisdiction. This should be applied to local and national levels to eliminate the practice early on.
Reform would not come easily — it demands that lawmakers curb their own families’ power, but civil society can play a role by publicizing abuses and pushing for higher standards in leadership to pressure politicians and inform voters.
Dynasties endure not just through wealth or legacy, but because a system built on name recognition shuts out merit. Power stays within these clans, and ordinary Filipinos remain locked out.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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