I observe international affairs from Washington, capital of a superpower which used to be the world’s more-or-less benevolent hegemon, but which is now groping for a different role as a potential imperialist carving up the planet into spheres of influence.
What if you are looking back at us in Washington from the capital of a non-major (if not “small”) power? A place, say, such as Hanoi, Jakarta, New Delhi, Pretoria, Abuja, Brasilia or Mexico City — or indeed Copenhagen, Ottawa or Panama City?
My advice, roughly 100 days into the second term of US President Donald Trump: Emulate Vietnam and adopt some version of its “bamboo diplomacy.” Bend with the geopolitical winds so that you do not snap. Keep all the major powers distant, if not equidistant, and hedge your bets. Trade with all who are open to it, and in multilateral arrangements where possible. Enter into fluid alliances to deter Russia, China, the US or anybody else where necessary, sometimes with one against the others. Do not trust the pacts you make with any of them, but do not provoke either. Do anything that would let you stay independent and sovereign.
Illustration: Yusha
Since that sounds a bit like bamboo swaying in the breeze — a motif that runs through Vietnam’s forests, art and psyche — the country’s late leader, Nguyen Phu Trong, made the plant a foreign-policy metaphor.
In dealing with the world, Vietnam needs “strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches,” he said. That makes sense for a country that has struggled for national survival against mighty and shifting powers such as China, France and the US, and now prizes its independence and sovereignty, the roots and trunk, above all other interests.
Vietnam’s maximalist version of bamboo diplomacy rests on “four noes”: No joining permanent alliances, no siding with one country against another, no letting other powers use its territory to launch wars and no threatening force in settling disputes. In practice, Vietnamese foreign policy amounts to finesse and balancing — signing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Washington (which would be a useful friend if China seizes Vietnamese shoals in the South China Sea) while simultaneously inking 36 cooperation agreements with Beijing in the name of building a “shared future.”
Vietnam also illustrates a drawback of bamboo diplomacy, though. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Hanoi faced a moral dilemma. It genuinely sympathized with Ukraine and decried the contravention of its sovereignty. However, it needed to avoid taking sides against Russia. The result looked less like bamboo and more like a contorted bonsai tree. Hanoi kept talking to Moscow and abstained from censuring the Kremlin at the UN. Simultaneously, it extended bilateral solidarity toward Kyiv and sent humanitarian aid.
Other countries, especially in the global south, already have similar foreign policies under different names. India aims for “multi-alignment”: It is a member of the Quad (a Western-flavored quasi-alliance including New Delhi, Washington, Canberra and Tokyo) while simultaneously buying oil and weapons from Moscow, and teaming up with Russia, China and others in the BRICS forum. Singapore, an island state and maritime node, practices “equidistant diplomacy” between the US and China. Turkey sees itself as a bridge between East and West, and belongs to NATO while buying Russian missile-defense systems.
In that way, bamboo diplomacy under any name is a better alternative to another strategy for minor powers that want to stay sovereign in the shadow of behemoths: Finlandization. It got its name from the arrangement Finland reached with the Soviet Union in 1948, when it agreed to remain non-aligned with what would become NATO and the EU, in effect yielding to Moscow’s foreign policy in return for staying independent. In botanical terms, a Finlandized country is like an epiphyte, a plant that grows on another plant and agrees not to bother its landlord. Much better to be bamboo.
Until recently, I would have counseled a grand strategy superior to either bamboo or epiphyte foreign policy. While the Pax Americana lasted — that is, the international order in which the US usually plumped for the system and its rules, and against aggression — I would have urged countries to pick one camp and make sure it is the US-led West. It has, broadly, been militarily strong, economically prosperous and politically free.
However, Trump canceled the Pax Americana in the name of “America First,” abandoning international order for anarchy and probably chaos. In this brave new world, pure idealism (thinking in terms of democracies against autocracies, say) is no longer a viable national strategy. Nor is rote allegiance to the US. The world under Trump is likely to get tempestuous, and your best bet of staying rooted and upright is to become bamboo.
Andreas Kluth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering US diplomacy, national security and geopolitics. Previously, he was editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for The Economist.
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