Big tech’s massive encroachment upon the levers of state authority under US President Donald Trump is creating a dangerous new power structure — one not confined to its homeland. Trump’s threats against nations — US allies and adversaries alike — that dare to regulate their digital markets and communications systems are not merely a case of economic bullying, rather, they are an attempt to export this power structure, and undermine the rule of law and democratic governance worldwide.
For example, Washington’s European allies risk tariffs and retaliation for enforcing much-needed digital regulations, as do the UK and Brazil for imposing a digital-services tax, but these challenges also create strategic opportunities for democracies. If they collectively refuse to submit to US pressure, it is less likely that any one government would bear the brunt of retaliation. These nations must therefore unite against the technology giants that mine their citizens’ data, control key information and commercial infrastructure, and refuse to pay taxes or even acknowledge the jurisdiction of national governments.
Of course, defending national interests while fostering genuine innovation is a difficult balancing act, but the unprecedented alliance forged between big tech and the Trump administration underscores the urgency of this task. As head of Trump’s US Department of Government Efficiency, Elon Musk, the world’s richest person, has gained access to government data systems, fired thousands of federal workers and taken aim at regulatory agencies. Musk has also used the US Federal Trade Commission as a cudgel against businesses that are reticent to advertise on his social media platform X, which he has turned into a megaphone for right-wing extremists, and a tool for disinformation and political interference.
Illustration: Mountain People
Musk is not the only technology boss to have bent the knee. When Mark Zuckerberg announced in January that Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, would end its fact-checking program, he repeated Trump’s talking points. More recently, Instagram concealed results when users searched for “Democrats,” and Facebook amplified posts from Trump and US Vice President J.D. Vance.
These are only the most prominent examples of how the world’s most powerful technology chief executives have aligned themselves with an authoritarian leader, shaping public discourse to his (and their own) benefit. When technology interests capture the US government to this extent, other nations must stand up to Trump’s threats to avert a global slide into techno-fascism.
Some will argue that by taking a strong regulatory stance, these nations risk losing access to technological innovation, but this fundamentally misreads the situation. Given the extraordinary protections and privileges they have secured at home, US technology giants do not need more favorable treatment from other nations. They need access to these nations’ markets. Advanced economies with skilled workforces, including the UK, Japan and those in Europe, are highly valuable, as are middle-income and emerging economies such as Brazil, Indonesia and India.
The revelation that China’s DeepSeek developed a large language model comparable to those of dominant American artificial intelligence firms at a fraction of the cost has underscored this point. It belies the narrative that only the biggest technology companies with the most advanced chips and the least restrictive regulatory environment can develop the best artificial intelligence, and shows that alternatives to the Silicon Valley model exist.
So far, Brazil is the only nation with the courage and conviction to challenge Musk (albeit before he joined the Trump administration). It is less clear whether Europe, which has recourse to its digital markets and artificial intelligence directives, would defend its right to regulate and rein in the “broligarchs’” power.
Because enforcing competition policy has implications beyond traditional market concerns, more nations should regulate digital services, focusing not just on market dominance, but also on a corporation’s ability to shape public discourse, control information flows and leverage data advantages to entrench its power. Allowing big tech to pursue unfettered artificial intelligence development that is environmentally and culturally destructive — or, worse, subsidizing such innovation — could pave the way for techno-fascism on a global scale.
Clear rules for protecting competition and intellectual property are far more likely to foster innovation than enabling dominant players to strengthen their monopoly power. For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation has, despite initial resistance, become a global standard, spurring privacy-enhancing innovation and acting as a safeguard against corporate overreach, especially with regard to data mining.
Similarly, requiring credit and compensation for the use of copyrighted materials for artificial intelligence training is not just about protecting creative industries. It is about integrating the development of these transformative technologies into the fabric of our economies and societies, before a handful of US companies get a chance to “move fast and break things” — like democracy and the rule of law — that are not easily repaired.
Instead of accepting a false choice between innovation and regulation, the world’s democracies have an opportunity to create the conditions for genuine innovation, not imitation, and show how democratic oversight can enable technological progress while preserving fundamental rights, but this requires recognizing that technology policy has become integral to resisting authoritarian tendencies.
Such a stance is not anti-US. In fact, it reflects concerns about the fusion of big tech and political power in the US that many Americans share. That makes it all the more important for other governments to ensure that digital technologies serve democracy and protect human dignity.
Courtney C. Radsch, director of the center for journalism and liberty at the Open Markets Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of Cyberactivism and Citizen Journalism in Egypt: Digital Dissidence and Political Change.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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