India’s purchase of 26 Rafale jets from France’s Dassault Aviation SA cannot conceal the fact that its military is sleepwalking into a crisis. Strategic indecision and an addiction to short-termism have left its armed forces unprepared for the challenges ahead.
The new planes would certainly fill an obvious gap in the military’s needs — its two aircraft carriers are dependent on 40 elderly Russian-built MiG-29Ks, of which perhaps half are reportedly serviceable at any given time. However, instead of solving India’s problems of preparedness, this decision actually reveals their daunting scale.
The real issue is not the navy, but the Indian Air Force (IAF), which is known to be understrength, and would likely be even less capable a few years from now unless New Delhi starts thinking long term. Scholars such as the Stimson Center’s Christopher Clary have warned that India is “underbalancing” China, both before and after deadly clashes along their disputed Himalayan border in 2020.
The problem is, defense planners do not like to spell out what the air force needs. The IAF is supposed to have 45, or at worst 42 squadrons, of 18 aircraft each. Today it would struggle to rustle up 32, and many of those would be one or two planes shy of their full complement. Some of these are ancient MiG-21s, which are due to be phased out this year. India might be left with only 25 or 26 active squadrons by the end of the decade.
The Pakistan Air Force, meanwhile, is supposedly in negotiations with Beijing to buy 40 J-35A fifth-generation fighters. There is general doubt in New Delhi that the Chinese would be willing and able to make Pakistan the first export destination for their prized jet, or that cash-strapped Islamabad would be able to pay for them, but some quietly worry that, if the deal somehow goes through, India’s overstretched air force could be outmatched not just by China’s, but by Pakistan’s.
How could it have gone so wrong for an IAF that, a few decades ago, was proud of its preparedness? Part of the problem lies with its timid and tight-lipped defense planners, and part with a government that is simply unwilling to pay the political and economic costs of military modernization.
New planes are expensive. The Rafales for the navy would cost US$7.4 billion. That would already stretch the defense procurement budget, and somehow officials would have to find the money for another 100-plus planes for the air force. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s fiscal conservatism has left defense spending at historical lows as a proportion of gross domestic product, and his political populism means too much of that is tied to unsustainable pension plans.
Adding to the difficulties, the defense establishment is inefficient even by the standards of the Indian state. Indigenous fighters, developed and manufactured by state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, were supposed to pick up the slack for the IAF and the navy. The military claims that HAL fails to deliver on time and to spec; the engineers complain that the military changes its mind and has unrealistic expectations.
The last time India tried to buy fighters on the open market, the tendering process took so long that Modi was forced to purchase 34 Rafales in a deal that he struck with the French government. That agreement — sans most of India’s usual demands, such as local manufacturing and technology transfer — was urgent because planners determined at least some new jets were needed for India’s nuclear deterrent.
It also caused some domestic political controversy. Defense scandals have brought down governments; the fear of corruption tends to paralyze the bureaucracy. Officials dread an open and structured procurement process, and would much rather the prime minister take the political risk of buying a plane directly.
This unwillingness to go through a proper deliberation and make a transparent choice is a disservice to India — because it leads to strategic indecision. We do not have answers to basic questions: How many planes do we need, and how modern do they have to be? Can we make do with cheaper indigenous fighters for a decade? Can we rule out buying more Russian hardware? Would we have to keep the Americans happy by buying the F-35, as US President Donald Trump clearly wants? Are we now locked into the Rafale, which is expensive and produced entirely in France? Or could we go with one of the other European alternatives, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon or Sweden’s Gripen, which might suit our circumstances far better?
Emergency, piecemeal purchases simply would not cut it. The IAF needs political direction and cover so it could produce a plan that takes it into the next decades — one that includes technology transfer and localized supply chains of the sort that we know, post-Ukraine, is vital if you get into a war. Whatever option delivers this is the one India must go with — and it cannot put off making a clear choice for much longer, or it would find itself outmatched in the sky.
Mihir Sharma is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, he is author of Restart: The Last Chance for the Indian Economy. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
President William Lai (賴清德) attended a dinner held by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) when representatives from the group visited Taiwan in October. In a speech at the event, Lai highlighted similarities in the geopolitical challenges faced by Israel and Taiwan, saying that the two countries “stand on the front line against authoritarianism.” Lai noted how Taiwan had “immediately condemned” the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas and had provided humanitarian aid. Lai was heavily criticized from some quarters for standing with AIPAC and Israel. On Nov. 4, the Taipei Times published an opinion article (“Speak out on the
Eighty-seven percent of Taiwan’s energy supply this year came from burning fossil fuels, with more than 47 percent of that from gas-fired power generation. The figures attracted international attention since they were in October published in a Reuters report, which highlighted the fragility and structural challenges of Taiwan’s energy sector, accumulated through long-standing policy choices. The nation’s overreliance on natural gas is proving unstable and inadequate. The rising use of natural gas does not project an image of a Taiwan committed to a green energy transition; rather, it seems that Taiwan is attempting to patch up structural gaps in lieu of
News about expanding security cooperation between Israel and Taiwan, including the visits of Deputy Minister of National Defense Po Horng-huei (柏鴻輝) in September and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Francois Wu (吳志中) this month, as well as growing ties in areas such as missile defense and cybersecurity, should not be viewed as isolated events. The emphasis on missile defense, including Taiwan’s newly introduced T-Dome project, is simply the most visible sign of a deeper trend that has been taking shape quietly over the past two to three years. Taipei is seeking to expand security and defense cooperation with Israel, something officials
“Can you tell me where the time and motivation will come from to get students to improve their English proficiency in four years of university?” The teacher’s question — not accusatory, just slightly exasperated — was directed at the panelists at the end of a recent conference on English language learning at Taiwanese universities. Perhaps thankfully for the professors on stage, her question was too big for the five minutes remaining. However, it hung over the venue like an ominous cloud on an otherwise sunny-skies day of research into English as a medium of instruction and the government’s Bilingual Nation 2030
RSS