A powerful magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck Myanmar on Friday, causing widespread devastation. Roads and bridges were destroyed, buildings collapsed, and the tremor resulted in significant loss of life and injuries.
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Taiwan swiftly mobilized a rescue team. The National Fire Agency prepared 120 personnel, along with 15 tonnes of essential equipment. Burmese and overseas Burmese expressed their appreciation for Taiwan’s prompt response to the crisis.
However, an announcement on Sunday left the nation shocked. Myanmar’s junta-led government reportedly denied several foreign rescue teams entry, including those from Taiwan. Rescue teams from Japan, Turkey and other nations also faced delays in receiving approval to enter Myanmar. The delay in allowing in aid endangers the lives of those affected by the earthquake, and the junta’s perceived prioritization of politics over humanitarian concerns has caused widespread disappointment among the populace.
Within Myanmar, a significant portion of the population, especially young people, has a clear understanding of Taiwan’s distinct identity. The terms “mainland China” and “Taiwan” are widely recognized as separate entities.
Such awareness derives is derived in part from Beijing’s consistent support for successive military juntas since the early 1990s. That support has allowed China to exert considerable influence over Myanmar’s markets, trade and natural resource management, generating substantial profits. It has also led to growing negative sentiment toward Beijing among many Burmese.
The junta government’s denial of entry for Taiwan’s rescue team has triggered expressions of regret from the public. It also strengthened an understanding of the junta’s political motivations, with many citizens questioning whether the Taiwanese were denied entry to appease Beijing.
Myanmar in December 1949 severed official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, then led by Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), following a request from Mao Zedong (毛澤東) through then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來). The following year, Myanmar established formal diplomatic relations with the China.
Recent events have prompted renewed debate regarding the government’s “one China policy.” Questions are being raised about whether successive Burmese governments, including the democratically elected administration from 2015 to 2021, have ever sought the public’s opinion on such a crucial policy. The governments have never adequately addressed public concerns about Myanmar’s relationships with China and Taiwan.
Such questioning does not necessarily advocate for escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait; rather, it asserts Myanmar’s right to determine its own diplomatic relationships, with the decisionmaking power residing in a government that genuinely represents the will of the people.
Myanmar has been under military rule since the coup in February 2021, when Burmese army general Min Aung Hlaing seized power and detained democratically elected civilian leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
It is plausible that a post-junta Myanmar could bring stronger relations and ties with Taipei.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that establishing friendly relations with Taiwan does not necessitate altering a country’s existing diplomatic ties. Therefore, neither Myanmar nor any other nation is compelled to make a binary choice between Beijing and Taipei. However, in Myanmar’s case, bolstering resilience against potential pressure from China would be essential.
People-to-people connections are arguably more significant than government-to-government relations. Taiwan has long been perceived as a friendly nation by Burmese, and an increasing number of young Burmese are choosing Taiwan as a destination for study and work. That trend reflects the promising and mutually accommodating relationship between Taiwan and Myanmar.
Hwa Teng is a Burmese student studying Mandarin at National Kaohsiung Normal University.
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would