Two US military vessels, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer the USS Ralph Johnson and the Pathfinder-class survey ship USNS Bowditch passed through the Taiwan Strait from Tuesday to Wednesday last week. That was the first time a US warship has transited the Strait since US President Donald Trump returned to the White House, attracting international attention.
The news was announced to the world by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Eastern Theater Command on Wednesday last week, accompanied by a strong statement. That behavior differed from Beijing’s previous pattern of waiting for the US military to release a report before issuing a condemnation.
It has almost become routine for US warships to transit the Taiwan Strait, so why did Beijing express its dissatisfaction differently this time? There is some speculation that, this time, the US vessels’ route was different from that of previous missions, signaling something unusual. That poses more of a direct challenge to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) territorial assertions over the Taiwan Strait — as a result, Beijing adopted a tougher stance in its response.
First, the USNS Bowditch spent nearly three days transiting the Strait — that demonstrates the ship might have not been merely passing through, but was possibly conducting maritime route exploration and surveys under the watchful eyes of PLA Navy vessels.
More importantly, the ship’s actions appeared to send an international message that the US Navy has already begun expanding battlefield management in the Taiwan Strait — that implies that the US Navy would be prepared to intervene in the event of a military conflict in the region. Thus, Beijing took the initiative to issue a warning and condemnation.
Second, in recent years, Beijing’s use of “legal warfare” over the Taiwan Strait has primarily focused on the argument that most of the strait falls within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to Article 9 of the Chinese 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf: “Any international organization, foreign organization or individual engaging in marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China must have the approval of the competent authorities of the People’s Republic of China and shall comply with the laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China.”
Article 11 of the law stipulates: “Any State, provided that it observes international law and the laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China, shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China freedom of navigation and overflight and of laying submarine cables and pipelines, and shall enjoy other legal and practical marine benefits associated with these freedoms.”
Thus, the USNS Bowditch’s movements not only contravene Article 9 of the law, but also did not qualify to enjoy the “freedom of navigation” outlined in Article 11. In other words, the US warship’s three-day exploration operation in the Taiwan Strait was tantamount to the US taking concrete action to challenge the CCP’s “legal warfare” in the Taiwan Strait — something Beijing refuses to take lightly.
In the first two weeks of this month, the Chinese military conducted two joint air and naval combat readiness patrols, and one military exercise during the Lantern Festival, near Taiwan. At a time when the PLA frequently conducts drills in the area, those two US warships openly transited the Taiwan Strait and directly showcased US military presence during an ongoing PLA military exercise — it is only natural that Beijing would kick up a fuss.
Chieh Chung is a research fellow and secretary-general at the Association of Strategic Foresight.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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