Georgia’s approach toward Russia and China represents a “choice of sides” by the government, led by the populist Georgian Dream (GD) party. To understand how and why Tbilisi has opted for joining the Chinese-Russian axis, it is important to mention some important facts.
First of all, GD’s alleged positive stance towards the EU was always contradicted by the statements and political decisions of its leadership. In terms of values and actions, the Georgian government holds a significantly different position from those of the EU Parliament and Commission.
One example is LGBTQ+ rights, with the GD’s posture clearly resembling that of Moscow or Beijing rather than that of Paris or Berlin. The Georgian ruling party’s stance on this issue can be seen in the recently approved “Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors.”
This legislation imposes several restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly for queer people, bans legal procedures for gender recognition and gender reassignment surgeries, and introduces censorship in media and education.
In addition, the law reaffirms the ban on same-sex marriage, while outlawing alternative forms of civil union among non-heterosexual couples.
Georgia’s shift away from the West was exacerbated by the highly contested parliamentary elections last year, which were marred by independent reports of irregularities and voter intimidation.
The pro-western opposition refused to concede the results, accusing the government of derailing the country’s path to EU membership. Since then, it has started round-the-clock protests on the streets of Tbilisi calling for new elections.
However, the Georgian authorities’ use of draconian new laws — which criminalize even symbolic acts such as “placing stickers on public property” — as well as the Electoral College’s appointment of Mikheil Kavelashvili — famous for his anti-western statements — as the new president of Georgia is a clear signal of GD’s intentions moving forward.
The ruling party’s chosen path is significantly out of step with the Georgian citizens’ interests and desires, as further proved by a National Democratic Institute poll on the country’s accession to the EU, with almost 80 percent of Georgians wanting their country to become part of the EU, regardless of partisan affiliation.
By advancing laws aimed at promoting reactionary politics, Georgia triggered a widely expected negative response from the EU Commission. In October of last year, in fact, the executive arm of the EU decided not to recommend opening EU membership talks with Georgia unless it “changes course.”
As it moves away from the West, the Georgian government aims to advance the country’s strategic partnership with China. As the former Georgian prime minister Irakli Garibashvili said: “Georgia is committing itself to China’s BRI as well as a new security architecture,” referring to the Global Security Initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
The strategic partnership document, signed by the parties in 2023, fits into the pattern of non-equal relations between Georgia and China.
On the one hand, it states that “Georgia firmly adheres to the ‘one China’ principle.” On the other hand, it fails to mention Georgia’s sovereignty over the two self-declared states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The reason behind this omission is China’s strategic relationship with Russia, the country that invaded Georgia in 2008 before declaring the two regions as sovereign states. While China is leveraging the relationship with Tbilisi for its own purposes, the latter is passively accepting a reality imposed on it by Beijing.
Georgia’s adherence to the “one China” principle, with no relationship between the two sides, was confirmed by then-minister of foreign affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) during an interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service in 2023. In that sense, he pointed out that “there is no practical, substantive or real relationship with Georgia.”
Whereas Taipei was determined to “communicate with the help of business leaders or through other channels,” as Wu said, the Georgian government made it clear that “they won’t engage with Taiwan.”
As it distances itself from the EU and the US, Georgia becomes increasingly dependent and vulnerable in its relationship with China. This leads to a situation in which China holds the power to impose its agenda on the South Caucasian state.
Georgia’s policies in many areas, such as the economy, civil rights and diplomacy, are the inevitable evidence of the leadership’s willingness to engage with radically different geopolitical actors to attain short-term goals at the expense of long-standing relations with the West.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at the online international law journal Il Caffe Geopolitico and the think tank Geopol 21.
An elderly mother and her daughter were found dead in Kaohsiung after having not been seen for several days, discovered only when a foul odor began to spread and drew neighbors’ attention. There have been many similar cases, but it is particularly troubling that some of the victims were excluded from the social welfare safety net because they did not meet eligibility criteria. According to media reports, the middle-aged daughter had sought help from the local borough warden. Although the warden did step in, many services were unavailable without out-of-pocket payments due to issues with eligibility, leaving the warden’s hands
When former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) first took office in 2016, she set ambitious goals for remaking the energy mix in Taiwan. At the core of this effort was a significant expansion of the percentage of renewable energy generated to keep pace with growing domestic and global demands to reduce emissions. This effort met with broad bipartisan support as all three major parties placed expanding renewable energy at the center of their energy platforms. However, over the past several years partisanship has become a major headwind in realizing a set of energy goals that all three parties profess to want. Tsai
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Monday announced that she would dissolve parliament on Friday. Although the snap election on Feb. 8 might appear to be a domestic affair, it would have real implications for Taiwan and regional security. Whether the Takaichi-led coalition can advance a stronger security policy lies in not just gaining enough seats in parliament to pass legislation, but also in a public mandate to push forward reforms to upgrade the Japanese military. As one of Taiwan’s closest neighbors, a boost in Japan’s defense capabilities would serve as a strong deterrent to China in acting unilaterally in the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Randhir Jaiswal told a news conference on Jan. 9, in response to China’s latest round of live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait: “India has an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region, in view of our trade, economic, people-to-people and maritime interests. We urge all parties to exercise restraint, avoid unilateral actions and resolve issues peacefully without threat or use of force.” The statement set a firm tone at the beginning of the year for India-Taiwan relations, and reflects New Delhi’s recognition of shared interests and the strategic importance of regional stability. While India