On Nov. 9, Indonesia and China released a joint statement on advancing their strategic partnership during Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to China. Both countries agreed to cooperate to become leaders of the global south.
In the document, China and Indonesia present themselves as “major developing countries and significant players” in the global south, signaling their aim to lead and offer an alternative to the global system. They uphold China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit as vital norms for international relations, emphasizing sovereignty, non-intervention, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence — values that align with the aspirations of many in the global south.
Indonesia’s aspiration to lead the global south has deep roots, illustrated by the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 and first Indonesian president Sukarno’s New Emerging Forces policy in the 1960s. In Southeast Asia, it positions itself as the leader of ASEAN. This enduring ambition is evident in the Indonesia-China joint statement.
Indonesia’s domestic obstacles challenge Jakarta and Beijing’s cooperation in fulfilling this ambition. Its experiences of being colonized by external powers have made Indonesia forever suspicious toward foreign powers, making it keep its distance from them. This is expressed in Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of bebas dan aktif (free and active), which obliges it to maintain its autonomy. Consequently, sovereignty and non-intervention become the basic norms of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This is the reason behind Indonesia’s ambiguity.
Indonesian elites see China’s rise as an opportunity that could balance US dominance in global politics. However, they also view China as a long-term threat, identifying it as the primary external challenge that must be managed. There are fears that China could threaten Indonesia’s autonomy.
This year’s State of Southeast Asia report by the Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore shows that opinions remain unchanged: 43 percent of Indonesian elites welcome China’s increasing political and strategic influence in the country, while 57 percent express concerns about this influence. Indonesia recognizes the need to balance its relations with China by fostering cooperation with the US to help mitigate China’s influence. Indonesia agreed to receive US$3 million from the US to fund a maritime training center in Batam.
Indonesia uses its relationship with China to limit US influence in the country, because it is also concerned about Washington. The Yusof Ishak Institute survey demonstrates that 72.6 percent of Indonesian elites are worried about the US’ influence in Indonesia. Indonesia strengthened economic cooperation with China by joining its Belt and Road Initiatives and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This hedging strategy allows Indonesia to maintain a distance from any foreign power.
This cautious foreign policy aims to maintain Indonesia’s autonomy and overcome its suspicions toward foreign powers. Hence, it is not easy for the nation to build strong bilateral cooperation with other countries to reach a common goal, such as cooperating with China to become leaders of the global south. Additionally, Prabowo has reiterated Indonesia’s commitment to its bebas dan aktif stance during his visit to Beijing last month. Considering this, influential Indonesian leaders have encouraged him to leverage this foreign policy approach throughout his presidency.
Wendy A. Prajuli is a doctoral student at the Institut fur Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Binus University in Indonesia.
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