In today’s shifting geopolitical landscape, few multilateral alliances are as steadfast — or as essential — as the Group of 77 (G77). Since its founding in 1964, the bloc has expanded to include 134 countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, collectively representing 80 percent of the world’s population and two-thirds of the UN’s member states.
However, the G77 has struggled to define its role in a rapidly changing world. That was evident at the group’s recent policy forum in New York, commemorating its 60th anniversary. I had the privilege of speaking at this event, hosted by its Ugandan chair, which highlighted the G77’s long-term challenges while showcasing its immense potential and growing global influence.
Formed as a coalition of the world’s poorest countries, the G77 was conceived as a “weapon of the weak,” initially seeking to leverage its large membership to amplify the Global South’s voice in multilateral institutions. Yet, despite its size, the group has been unable to reshape the Westphalian state system and US-dominated postwar economic order — structures established long before many developing countries gained their independence.
The G77’s origins can be traced to the inaugural session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. From the outset, the bloc has sought to challenge US-designed institutions — such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and its successor, the World Trade Organization — and promote a more equitable international order. At its first ministerial summit in October 1967, the group adopted the Algiers Charter, which called for sweeping reforms to address the hardships faced by developing countries in a global economic system heavily skewed in favor of the West.
The Non-Aligned Movement emerged as a natural ally to the G77, with many overlapping members and shared objectives. Both groups drove transformative advances in international law, championing the principle of self-determination — especially in Palestine and Western Sahara — while affirming the legitimacy of decolonization and armed resistance in Algeria, Mozambique, South Africa and Vietnam. They denounced South Africa’s apartheid system as a “crime against humanity.”
Those efforts were inspired by the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, a landmark UN resolution that became a cornerstone of the decolonization movement. During this period, an unspoken Afro-Arab alliance emerged, as African countries supported the Palestinian struggle for statehood and Arab governments backed Black South Africans in their fight against white settler rule.
In its quest to challenge Western-dominated systems, the G77 has also cultivated a unique and enduring alliance with China. That relationship, shaped by heated North-South debates in the UN General Assembly, deepened after the G77 played a pivotal role in Taiwan’s 1971 expulsion from the UN, clearing the way for China to take its seat. Although not formally part of the G77, China remains the only permanent member of the UN Security Council to be regularly invited to its meetings.
However, the G77, with its sprawling, diverse membership, has faced difficulties maintaining internal unity. The Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 Sino-Indian War, in particular, raised doubts about the non-alignment of countries hosting foreign military bases, testing the bloc’s cohesion.
With its 1973 oil embargo, which nearly quadrupled oil prices, OPEC introduced a powerful new weapon of the weak, spurring the G77 to call for the establishment of a new international economic order. That ambitious vision involved restructuring the global economic system to transfer resources and technology from the Global North to the South, fostering self-sufficiency through intra-regional trade, infrastructure investment and industrialization.
The G77 actively sought to advance a new global economic order, focusing on key areas such as energy, food and agriculture, water, trade, technology and South-South cooperation. However, after the end of the Cold War, the group adopted a less adversarial approach. That pragmatic turn could be at least partly attributed to the “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s, which left many developing countries deeply indebted and increasingly dependent on Western-dominated financial institutions.
Consequently, while the G77 has continued to push for comprehensive reforms of multilateral institutions, and remained steadfast in its support for Palestinian liberation and the lifting of the US trade embargo against Cuba, the bloc’s summits since 2000 have largely focused on broader themes such as security, justice and democracy.
Moreover, the G77’s internal dynamics have changed over time. By 2019, more than 30 of the group’s members had graduated to middle-income status. As Singapore, South Korea, India and Brazil edged closer to joining the ranks of the world’s rich economies, their priorities began to diverge from those of most G77 countries.
The G77 policy forum in October reflected this shift. Reaffirming the bloc’s traditional emphasis on group solidarity, democratization of global economic governance, and a shared commitment to sustainable development and social justice — speakers from countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Algeria and Cuba articulated a clear message: The Global South’s aspirations must be recognized. At the same time, the event reflected the group’s evolving priorities, underscoring the need to build resilience, tackle hunger and disease, bridge the digital divide, achieve climate justice and end “vaccine apartheid.”
G77 diplomats translated these principles into a series of concrete demands: debt relief, preferential trade access for Global South countries, food security, fulfillment of aid commitments, adequate financing for the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and stronger regional development banks. They also addressed systemic inequities, calling to limit the power of Western credit rating agencies, and end the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
Regrettably, former US president Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election threatens to derail efforts to foster effective multilateralism and bolster development funding, underscoring the critical importance of the G77’s mission. Given its proven ability to forge global coalitions, the group is uniquely positioned to lead the international resistance to Trump’s unilateralist agenda.
Adekeye Adebajo, a professor and a senior research fellow at the University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship in South Africa, served on UN missions in South Africa, Western Sahara and Iraq. He is author of Global Africa: Profiles in Courage, Creativity, and Cruelty and The Eagle and the Springbok: Essays on Nigeria and South Africa.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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