US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Saturday last week held a face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Lima. Their dialogue has been widely interpreted as an effort by Xi to lay out China’s positions ahead of US president-elect Donald Trump taking office in two months. Chinese state media also reportedly misrepresented the meeting by claiming that Xi made an unprecedented mention of President William Lai (賴清德), a move that demonstrates China’s use of cognitive warfare tactics.
According to transcripts released by the White House and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xi said: “China is ready to work with a new US administration to maintain communication, expand cooperation and manage differences, so as to strive for a steady transition of the China-US relationship.”
This statement signals Xi’s concern that Trump would provoke new trade wars and diplomatic upheaval between the two leading powers, and expressed his desire to reduce tensions.
However, Xi also restated four “red lines” that the US should not challenge: the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right in a warning to the incoming US president.
According to the Chinese readout, Xi also mentioned Taiwan’s president and the ruling Democratic Progress Party (DPP) by name, saying: “If the US side cared about maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait, it is crucial that it sees clearly the true nature of Lai Ching-te and the DPP authorities in seeking Taiwan independence, handles the Taiwan question with extra prudence, unequivocally opposes Taiwan independence and supports China’s peaceful reunification.”
If Xi did mention Lai to Biden’s face, such a move would be in contrast to the tradition of Chinese leaders never directly mentioning the names of Taiwan’s leaders at international events.
Responding to an inquiry from Taiwan, US officials said that Xi did not mention any specific Taiwan leader or party during the meeting.
It has been a long-standing practice for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to misrepresent the contents of international meetings as part of its cognitive warfare to downplay Taiwan and to mislead the international community. After a meeting in May between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and the Chinese premier, Seoul said Beijing misreported that Yoon had said “South Korea adheres to the one China principle.” Yoon only said that he “respects” China’s principle, but that he remains opposed to “changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force,” Seoul said.
After a meeting between the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers in July, a Chinese news release mischaracterized then-Japanese minister of foreign affairs Yoko Kamikawa’s remarks as “Japan’s adherence to the one China principle.” She had oly expressed concern about China’s military activities and called for peace across the Taiwan Strait.
The most recent attempt — interjecting Lai’s name into the Biden-Xi meeting — was an attempt to cover up the fact that many leaders at the APEC summit have underlined the importance of peace in the Taiwan Strait. It also showed China’s intention to distract from its own role in fomenting instability in the Taiwan Strait by trying to shift the blame to Taiwan.
With China to host the 2026 APEC summit, member countries are concerned about its national security legislation and are worried it could breach the human rights of foreign attendees. However, China’s cognitive disinformation measures are more likely to be a greater challenge for APEC members and international attendees.
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