As the world ponders what US president-elect Donald Trump’s second term would mean for relations with the world’s largest economy and most powerful military, Taiwan has unique considerations and anxieties about the next four years as it seeks to maintain a stable partnership with its most critical ally.
While Trump was widely hailed in his first term for his precedent-breaking phone call with then-president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and record arms sales to the country, many Taiwanese have come to view Trump with a modicum of concern.
Trump has accused Taiwan of “stealing” the US’ chip industry, compared it to the tip of his Sharpie pen and China to his Resolute desk — implying the US should cut a deal with China — called for Taiwan to “pay for its defense” and at times effusively praised Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Trump is not inherently ideological, and gravitates toward what he sees as “deals.”
With such a “dealmaker,” there is always a path that can be pursued, and Taiwan must make a convincing argument.
However, the path to Trump now runs through a vastly different circle of advisors than the traditional Republican neocons, such as former US national security adviser John Bolton, who staffed Trump’s first administration.
Taiwan has long successfully engaged these constituencies, but all indications make it clear now that Trump intends to sharply depart from the US’ foreign policy establishment.
The nation would need to rely less on winning over easy targets, such as former US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley and former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo, and more on ascendant figures of the populist right such as US vice president-elect JD Vance and businessman Vivek Ramaswamy.
Neoconservatives such as Haley and Pompeo would reliably support defending Taiwan, but they would not feature in the coming administration.
While Vance and Ramaswamy have called for defending Taipei in the short term, both have indicated a degree of skepticism and linked the nation’s defense to forms of economic nationalism and a need to reshore manufacturing capabilities.
With Texas this week trying to woo Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) to expand its Arizona operations to the Lone Star state, TSMC executives should instead consider targeting “rust belt” states that are sorely in need of investment and good paying jobs in advanced manufacturing.
US and Taiwanese trade officials should learn from the successes of TSMC’s Arizona fab and the failures of Foxconn Wisconsin to pursue successful economic development projects in the US Midwest, a region of critical importance for the Trump-Vance coalition.
Vance and Ramaswamy have expressed skepticism about defending Taiwan if it is less than fully committed to its own defense, a position advocated by former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development Elbridge Colby, who would likely be a key member of Trump’s national security team.
While Tsai and President William Lai (賴清德) have rhetorically made it clear that Taiwan is serious about defending itself, concrete military reforms are still needed to harden society into a “porcupine” against China.
The Chinese Nationalist Party-led (KMT) legislative gridlock is a serious barrier to these reforms, but historical amity between the Republican Party and the KMT might provide an olive branch. Strong party-to-party relations could decrease “US skepticism” within the KMT, and potentially play a mediating role between Lai and opposition lawmakers.
Getting serious about military readiness is not simply a matter of “paying for defense” — Taiwan already exceeds NATO’s guideline of 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, reforms in training, reserve mobilization and overall defense strategy are needed to indicate Taiwan is serious about defending itself and not living large on the US defense umbrella like the Europeans.
The US is also at fault here: Vance and Ramaswamy have correctly identified that US deindustrialization has led to critical shortages in available defense materiel for Taiwan.
The nation is still waiting for more than US$20.5 billion in a backlog of arms sales that Taiwanese taxpayers have already paid for, while arms are shipped on US taxpayers’ dime to Ukraine and Israel.
Appealing to Trump’s new inner circle would be critical, but Taiwan should continue to maintain its bipartisan outlook in the US. The Democrats might narrowly win back the US House of Representatives, meaning Taiwan would still need to work with both parties.
If Tsai visits the US this year, she should meet with both US House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson and US House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, who is likely to become speaker if Democrats succeed in taking the House, continuing the strong relationship she forged with former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Finally, Taiwan would need to pursue new efforts to appeal directly to the American public. The wild slings over the past eight years of US politics have demonstrated that leaders and policies change with the winds. Yet one constant in this is the American public, who direct these changes through the ballot box, just as Taiwanese do.
Distrustful of the US foreign policy establishment that drove the US into “forever wars” for two decades, Americans harbor deep skepticism about open-ended security commitments.
Therefore, Taiwan should engage in more strategic public diplomacy directly with the American public, telling Taiwan’s story to ordinary Americans and building the case for an enduring commitment to Taiwan.
Sasha B. Chhabra is an analyst, commentator and media consultant on China’s foreign policy, Taiwanese politics and cross-strait affairs.
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