Contrary to expectations, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) semiconductor plant in Arizona is reportedly on track to meet its production targets next year. This announcement poses a challenge to the many observers who predicted that the effort to bring chip manufacturing back to the US would fail. What went right this time?
Skepticism surrounding the Arizona plant stemmed from the belief that chip manufacturing benefits heavily from learning-by-doing and dynamic economies of scale, both of which give incumbents a significant cost advantage. That is how TSMC maintains its dominant market position, especially in cutting-edge technologies, producing about 92 percent of the world’s most advanced logic chips at its plants in Taiwan.
It was this high concentration that prompted calls to diversify production in the interest of ensuring supply chain resilience, but the same learning-by-doing imperative is an obstacle for new entrants, casting doubts on projects such as the one in Arizona. Moreover, with anti-immigration sentiment on the rise, concerns about the US’ ability to attract skilled labor added to the pessimism.
Yet the gloomy predictions turned out to be overstated. While learning is crucial in chip manufacturing, new entrants’ ability to compete with incumbents depends more on the nature of the learning. In new research, my colleagues and I find that in semiconductors, learning-by-doing is not as technology-node specific as it is firm specific. Thus, TSMC’s advantage is not necessarily in producing advanced chips more efficiently, but in transferring its knowledge and expertise across different technologies. That means its success could well be replicated in other locations, as long as new plants can build on the Taiwanese parent’s experience, rather than starting from scratch.
Another important factor is the cross-border spillover of knowledge. The same research finds substantial spillovers in the transmission of learning across borders. While the exact mechanisms are unclear, foreign technology transfers — including through foreign direct investment and cross-border recruitment — are likely to play a significant role.
Moreover, since the semiconductor supply chain is structured on the “fabless foundry” model (whereby chip design companies outsource chip fabrication), it, too, facilitates knowledge transfers between nations. Chip design and manufacturing involve close collaboration between buyers and manufacturers around the world, with buyers often a major player in the dissemination of practical knowledge.
These beneficial cross-border knowledge spillovers suggest that government support alone cannot guarantee success in an industry. Taiwan and South Korea owe their dominance in chip manufacturing not only to significant government subsidies, but also to access to foreign advanced technologies.
By contrast, China, despite heavy government support, has not yet reached the frontiers of semiconductor technology. China’s experience shows that while government support can be beneficial, access to foreign technology is crucial. China’s struggles — set against Taiwan’s successes — offer valuable lessons for technologically innovative sectors.
A similar pattern appears in China’s far more successful industrial policy for the automobile sector, where joint ventures between domestic firms and more technologically advanced foreign manufacturers proved instrumental. As with semiconductors, collaboration between firms in different nations stands out as the main driver of technology and improvements in product quality.
Such cross-border learning spillovers have three big implications for current policy. First, the US does indeed stand a strong chance of catching up with Taiwan in semiconductor manufacturing, given the close cooperation between the two nations and the US’ leading position in research and chip design. Second, efforts to slow China’s progress in semiconductors are likely to succeed, considering that US export restrictions have effectively cut China off from foreign advanced technology. Lastly, other nations looking to become major players in the semiconductor industry (such as India) are dependent on US technological leadership. No matter how much financial support these nations provide, they are unlikely to succeed without US technological backing. An industrial policy that might work for the US, the technology leader, would not necessarily work for others.
The key takeaway is that the US remains in the driver’s seat. With its technological leadership and scale, it is poised to meet its semiconductor policy goals — strengthening supply chain resilience and weakening China’s position. Still, one must ask whether these objectives are worthwhile.
While diversifying the supply chain away from a single, geopolitically sensitive location makes sense, it is unclear why chip manufacturing must be brought back to the US, as opposed to other allied nations that might be able to produce at a lower cost. Moreover, the need to slow China’s chipmaking progress remains debatable, except in specific cases where there are legitimate national security concerns.
Historically, the US achieved technological leadership while also lifting up many other nations. The US stayed on top in innovative activities such as research and design, but the gap between it and the rest of the world narrowed. However, the strategy has shifted to one in which the US remains on top by pushing others down.
Yet as US Vice President Kamala Harris argued at the presidential debate: “The true ... leader actually understands that strength is not in beating people down, it’s in lifting people up.”
This applies not only to people, but to nations.
Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, a former World Bank Group chief economist and editor-in-chief of the American Economic Review, is professor of economics at Yale University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
From the Iran war and nuclear weapons to tariffs and artificial intelligence, the agenda for this week’s Beijing summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is packed. Xi would almost certainly bring up Taiwan, if only to demonstrate his inflexibility on the matter. However, no one needs to meet with Xi face-to-face to understand his stance. A visit to the National Museum of China in Beijing — in particular, the “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition, which chronicles the rise and rule of the Chinese Communist Party — might be even more revealing. Xi took the members
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) on Friday used their legislative majority to push their version of a special defense budget bill to fund the purchase of US military equipment, with the combined spending capped at NT$780 billion (US$24.78 billion). The bill, which fell short of the Executive Yuan’s NT$1.25 trillion request, was passed by a 59-0 margin with 48 abstentions in the 113-seat legislature. KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), who reportedly met with TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) for a private meeting before holding a joint post-vote news conference, was said to have mobilized her
The inter-Korean relationship, long defined by national division, offers the clearest mirror within East Asia for cross-strait relations. Yet even there, reunification language is breaking down. The South Korean government disclosed on Wednesday last week that North Korea’s constitutional revision in March had deleted references to reunification and added a territorial clause defining its border with South Korea. South Korea is also seriously debating whether national reunification with North Korea is still necessary. On April 27, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung marked the eighth anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration, the 2018 inter-Korean agreement in which the two Koreas pledged to
As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly widespread in workplaces, some people stand to benefit from the technology while others face lower wages and fewer job opportunities. However, from a longer-term perspective, as AI is applied more extensively to business operations, the personnel issue is not just about changes in job opportunities, but also about a structural mismatch between skills and demand. This is precisely the most pressing issue in the current labor market. Tai Wei-chun (戴偉峻), director-general of the Institute of Artificial Intelligence Innovation at the Institute for Information Industry, said in a recent interview with the Chinese-language Liberty Times