Following China’s rapid rise in the past few years, its People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has already changed the face of the first island chain.
On April 17, the Australian Department of Defence published two key documents: the 2024 National Defence Strategy and the 2024 Integrated Investment Program.
In addition to delineating a new “deterrence strategy” to bolster efforts against China’s expansion, it specifically states that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) must carry out its AUKUS submarine plans and build up the Royal Australian Air Force’s long-distance strike capabilities.
Why is the Australian military putting forward these defense strategies?
Strictly speaking, it has to do with the nation’s inability to shake off its strategic location along the periphery of the Pacific.
The RAN has, for a long time, used older, conventional vessels as the core of its submarine fleet, but although China is situated several thousands of kilometers away from Australia, PLAN’s underwater and surface fleet expansions necessitates an upgrade.
Due to Australia’s strategic position along the second island chain, it served as a critical ally of the US during World War II. Likewise, it plays a key role in the Western system of alliances led by the US against China, which is a revisionist power intent on breaking the regional order.
We can look at Australia’s basis for strengthening its own defenses through three categorizations.
First, Australia is a massive island. The PLA’s lack of power projection capabilities in the past century led to the relative stability of Australia’s defense and security. However, after Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) rose to power in 2012, Beijing has continued to promote the “China Dream” while bolstering its own military ambitions.
These developments pose credible and realistic threats to countries strung along the first and second island chains. Enhancing national security and constructing a more secure maritime and aerial defensive parameter has become a shared goal for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Australia.
Second, Australia has long had plans to grow its nuclear submarine fleet through the AUKUS alliance with the UK and the US, raising underwater deterrence through long-term underwater warfare capabilities. At the same time, because nuclear-powered submarines possess considerable capabilities, they could serve as Australia’s underwater deterrence force in times of peace and a powerful striking capability in wartime.
Additionally, plans to build nuclear submarines benefit Australia’s national defense industry development. Its membership in AUKUS could be called a great, long-term investment in the country’s national defense and security.
Third, the PLA has sharply increased its power and continues to appear in the waters and airspace in and around the first and second island chains. Since Australia is a small-to-medium-sized country in the region, its national security needs are shaped by threats beyond its immediate environment.
To improve national security, the Australian government and military are taking the initiative to invest heavily in their defense.
Not only do these policies aid its future security, they also highlight the nation’s responsibility in maintaining order in the second island chain.
Ray Song is a doctoral student at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Tim Smith
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
As the new year dawns, Taiwan faces a range of external uncertainties that could impact the safety and prosperity of its people and reverberate in its politics. Here are a few key questions that could spill over into Taiwan in the year ahead. WILL THE AI BUBBLE POP? The global AI boom supported Taiwan’s significant economic expansion in 2025. Taiwan’s economy grew over 7 percent and set records for exports, imports, and trade surplus. There is a brewing debate among investors about whether the AI boom will carry forward into 2026. Skeptics warn that AI-led global equity markets are overvalued and overleveraged
RSS