Chinese villages are being built in the disputed zone between Bhutan and China. Last month, Chinese settlers, holding photographs of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), moved into their new homes on land that was not Xi’s to give. These residents are part of the Chinese government’s resettlement program, relocating Tibetan families into the territory China claims.
China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China Sea involve Vietnam (Paracel Islands, also known as Xisha Islands [西沙群島]), the Philippines (Scarborough Shoal, or Huangyan Island [黃岩島]), and parts of Spratly Islands [Nansha Islands, 南沙群島]), Malaysia (parts of Spratly Islands), Brunei (parts of Spratly Islands) and Taiwan. Last year, Beijing published a map claiming most of these territories as part of the People’s Republic of China.
The Bhutan dispute epitomizes a David versus Goliath scenario: with a population of only 777,486 and a standing military of 7,500 soldiers, it is incapable of defending itself from China. Despite its small size, the dispute holds significant importance due to its strategic location between India and China. Any alteration in Bhutan’s borders could directly affect the national security of India and Nepal.
In 2017, the Doklam plateau dispute erupted between India and China in the tri-junction area claimed by Bhutan, India and China. A platoon of Chinese border guards demolished Royal Bhutan Army bunkers. Subsequently, a Chinese road construction crew arrived, accompanied by more Chinese soldiers. India, Bhutan’s de facto security guarantor under the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, sent troops to obstruct the Chinese construction. After intermittent skirmishes, both sides agreed to withdraw forces.
In 2020, China asserted its claim to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, leading Thimphu to complain at the Chinese embassy in India. Last year, China built 150 new homes, doubling the size of a border village named Gyalaphug. The village includes a Chinese Communist Party Community Center with amenities. Chinese state media said that the village was established in 2007 with just two homes and no basic utilities.
By 2018, this and other border villages became models of Xi’s poverty alleviation program. The media report mentioned that by the end of 2021, 620 border villages had undergone similar transformations to alleviate poverty and enhance border security.
In October 2021, Thimphu and Beijing signed a three-step roadmap memorandum of understanding to expedite border negotiations, excluding the tri-junction area involving India.
However, China is now violating that agreement by settling into areas that have not yet been decided upon and developing infrastructure within the disputed zone, raising further concerns. This infrastructure could serve military purposes or bolster China’s claim on the territory. A stronger Chinese military presence near Bhutan’s borders could jeopardize India’s access to the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor, connecting seven northeastern Indian states to the rest of the nation. The terms of the Treaty of Friendship prohibit either party from allowing a foreign country to occupy its territory in a manner threatening the other’s national security.
The dispute could lead to various outcomes. Bhutan might concede to Beijing’s claims on the disputed Jakarlung and Pasamlung territories, which are less strategically significant to India. However, any territory concession by Thimphu to China raises concerns about its territorial integrity.
Another possibility is Bhutan agreeing to a land swap with China in Doklam, jeopardizing India’s national security due to the proximity to the Siliguri Corridor. This would further strain the already complex relationship between New Delhi and Beijing.
The dispute adds to broader tensions in the Himalayas, where China also has a border dispute with Nepal. Nepalese sources claim China moved the boundary, encroaching 1,500m into Nepal near the Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts.
A stronger Chinese presence on Bhutan’s borders could potentially embolden Beijing in its border dispute with Nepal.
Thimphu has assured New Delhi that it would not make a decision without a three-way consultation. However, the Indian side worries that despite the absence of official diplomatic relations between China and Bhutan, Beijing might wield asymmetric negotiating power, using its regional economic and military dominance.
If Beijing successfully acquires Doklam without firing a shot, this could become its new expansion strategy. It would also undermine India’s role as the de facto security guarantor for Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, as well as for the exiled Tibetan community.
Antonio Graceffo, a China economic analyst who holds a China MBA from Shanghai Jiaotong University, studies national defense at the American Military University in West Virginia.
On March 22, 2023, at the close of their meeting in Moscow, media microphones were allowed to record Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictator Xi Jinping (習近平) telling Russia’s dictator Vladimir Putin, “Right now there are changes — the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years — and we are the ones driving these changes together.” Widely read as Xi’s oath to create a China-Russia-dominated world order, it can be considered a high point for the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea (CRINK) informal alliance, which also included the dictatorships of Venezuela and Cuba. China enables and assists Russia’s war against Ukraine and North Korea’s
After thousands of Taiwanese fans poured into the Tokyo Dome to cheer for Taiwan’s national team in the World Baseball Classic’s (WBC) Pool C games, an image of food and drink waste left at the stadium said to have been left by Taiwanese fans began spreading on social media. The image sparked wide debate, only later to be revealed as an artificially generated image. The image caption claimed that “Taiwanese left trash everywhere after watching the game in Tokyo Dome,” and said that one of the “three bad habits” of Taiwanese is littering. However, a reporter from a Japanese media outlet
Taiwanese pragmatism has long been praised when it comes to addressing Chinese attempts to erase Taiwan from the international stage. “Taipei” and the even more inaccurate and degrading “Chinese Taipei,” imposed titles required to participate in international events, are loathed by Taiwanese. That is why there was huge applause in Taiwan when Japanese public broadcaster NHK referred to the Taiwanese Olympic team as “Taiwan,” instead of “Chinese Taipei” during the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Olympics. What is standard protocol for most nations — calling a national team by the name their country is commonly known by — is impossible for
India is not China, and many of its residents fear it never will be. It is hard to imagine a future in which the subcontinent’s manufacturing dominates the world, its foreign investment shapes nations’ destinies, and the challenge of its economic system forces the West to reshape its own policies and principles. However, that is, apparently, what the US administration fears. Speaking in New Delhi last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau warned that “we will not make the same mistakes with India that we did with China 20 years ago.” Although he claimed the recently agreed framework