Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) landed himself in hot water again after he said in an interview with Deutsche Welle on Wednesday last week that Taiwanese would “accept unification” with China.
Ma said that unification is an aim of the Republic of China through the Constitution, and that Taiwanese would accept unification if it were achieved “peacefully and through a democratic process.”
While Ma is correct on the Constitution, he is wrong about public sentiment. Several independent polls regularly show Taiwanese overwhelmingly want to preserve the so-called “status quo” of Taiwan-China relations.
Arguably, the growing number of incursions by China’s military into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone indicate that no such “status quo” exists, and that China is seeking to push unification through the coercion of Taiwanese. Nevertheless, it could be said that most Taiwanese would not accept China’s proposal to turn Taiwan into a Special Administrative Region akin to Hong Kong and Macau. Taiwanese demonstrated this on Saturday last week when they voted for president-elect William Lai (賴清德).
Public opinion seems to be lost on Ma, who said in the interview that Taiwanese “have to” trust Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on cross-strait relations. He said that, despite Beijing blatantly breaking its promise to the UK to protect Hong Kong’s freedoms and autonomy until 2047 when it promulgated the territory’s National Security Law in 2020 and proceeded to carry out widespread arrests of democracy advocates.
Ma’s remarks were rebuffed by the Democratic Progressive Party and dismissed by his own Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), and could be ignored as the personal opinions of an out-of-touch former president.
However, what should not be ignored are Ma’s comments on Taiwan’s defense. Ma told the interviewer that Taiwan should cut defense spending, saying it was “too optimistic” to expect Taiwan to defend itself during a Chinese attack until Japan or the US intervened.
“No matter how much you defend yourself, you can never fight a war with the mainland. You can never win, they [China] are too large, too much stronger than us,” the Central News Agency quoted Ma as saying.
Ma’s defeatist attitude is destructive to the morale of the military and of KMT supporters who might draw inspiration from him. His comments also fly in the face of the US military officials and analysts who have said that Taiwan needs to boost defense — which it has been doing. Taiwan is building and procuring more air-defense missile systems, and building its own corvettes and submarines, all of which are important measures needing support.
Thankfully, the defeated KMT presidential candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), publicly responded to Ma’s interview, saying: “Ma’s thinking differs from my own.”
“My consistent policy is the 3D strategy of deterrence, strengthening national defense and armaments, and increasing self-defense capabilities while pursuing dialogue and discussion,” Hou said at a campaign event.
If elected, he would “stubbornly defend Taiwan’s democracy and freedom while opposing Beijing’s ‘one country, two systems’ formula for unifying with Taiwan,” he said.
Seemingly to clarify its non-alignment with Ma on Taiwan’s defense, the KMT did not invite him to its election-eve rally in New Taipei City.
“Former president Ma and I have very different positions on certain issues. If elected, I will not touch on issues regarding unification with China,” Hou said at the rally.
It is promising to see the KMT distance itself from Ma, and it shows it is aware that the public does not support unification. Given China’s cognitive warfare efforts and constant threats, Taiwan’s military needs affirmation and a morale boost. Anything that saps morale should be met with a swift response.
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