The voter turnout for Saturday’s presidential election was a respectable 71 percent, but still 3 percent less than four years ago.
Although this election was crucial, it was not as crucial as some outsiders might have thought. Taiwanese had their finger on the pulse of what the nation’s diverse needs were and how they could best be met.
Four basic takeaways explain this:
The first takeaway is the presidency. The victory of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate, Vice President William Lai (賴清德), was a major change from the past. The nation stayed with the DPP after eight years, despite China’s intimidation attempts and despite Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) garnering 26.46 percent of the vote.
The DPP broke the pattern of alternating party presidencies. Lai broke this tradition of voters alternating trust with one party and then the other. Lai’s victory marks three consecutive terms for the DPP with the possibility of four.
However. the day did not completely end in the DPP’s favor. While this was a great start, Lai won with only 40.05 percent of the vote. The Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), followed with 33.49 percent. Both parties lost votes due to Ko’s participation in the election, which was a game changer, particularly in the Legislative Yuan.
Understanding the Legislative Yuan vote is the second takeaway. In it, the DPP lost 10 seats and the majority it had held for the past eight years, dropping from 61 to 51 seats out of the 113-seat legislature. This was the first time in the past 16 years that the party holding the presidency could not count on having a legislative majority.
It is not the end of the world for the DPP, but it means it might have to do some horse-trading. However, while the KMT gained seats, it also only has 52 seats plus the two independent legislators who align with it. No party won 57 seats — a legislative majority. Therefore, the TPP, which garnered eight seats, could become a kingmaker, depending on which party it teams up with to name the speaker of the legislature.
However, the TPP’s position is also not that strong. It only gained three seats, and those were from the party vote. The TPP had no individually elected district candidates.
This imbalance is not the same one that former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) faced in 2000 and 2004 when the KMT and the People First Party (PFP) united against him in a pan-blue opposition. Nonetheless, the TPP has bargaining power; it could help either the DPP or the KMT to name the speaker.
This leads to the third takeaway: the role of third parties in Taiwanese politics.
Taiwan has not lacked in having three or more parties running in elections. These parties rise to meet and express certain needs, but they lack sustainability. The past is littered with the fallen bodies of such parties. Taiwan has seen the rise and fall of the New Party, the PFP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and the New Power Party (NPP), to name a few.
This is what the TPP and other third parties face. Compare Ko’s 26.46 percent of the vote with PFP Chairman James Soong’s (宋楚瑜) 36.84 percent when running as an independent when he almost won the 2000 election. Soong went on to form the PFP, which played a dominant role, but his party eventually faded. He could not build a long-standing team and this proved to be the case where if you strike the shepherd, the sheep would scatter.
I do not expect the TPP to survive the next presidential election in 2028.
Moreover, if one looks at the popular party vote for the legislature, the DPP added more than 150,000 votes to its popular vote in 2020, and the KMT gained about 60,000 votes over the same period. They both maxed out, naming 13 legislators-at-large.
So where did the eight TPP legislators-at-large come from? It had five legislators-at-large; it only gained three more. This time, the losers of the popular vote were the NPP and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party.
Taiwan is in need of third parties and they constantly rise to express the needs of the moment, but none have taken hold.
This leads to the final takeaway: the role of China. Despite its threats and bullying, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not influence this year’s elections as much as it hoped. Its time would be better spent trying to solve its own growing problems of economic downturn, corruption and despotism.
Even with the good weather, voter turnout in Taiwan dropped slightly, and Taiwanese put more trust in the DPP in dealing with the PRC. Taiwanese were satisfied with the “status quo” and their de facto independence. There are more pressing needs than saying the dreaded “I” word: Independence.
The KMT sensed this and did not invite pro-unification former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to speak at its final pre-election rally. His speaking would have only put another nail in the party’s coffin. What the KMT still lacks is the ability to forgo mentioning the fake “1992 consensus.”
With the temporary acceptance of the TPP, Taiwanese were saying that they wanted the DPP to figure out a way to foster trade with China, while keeping it at arm’s length.
I voted in this election and all in all, it proved to be a satisfying day. There were no dominant winners. The DPP learned that it needs to work harder to maintain viable district legislators. The KMT is learning to abandon its pro-unification jargon. The TPP needs to do its homework if it expects to survive. I still do not think it will; its members would only morph into another need of the nation as it progresses.
Jerome Keating is a writer based in Taipei.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
RSS