Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) on Wednesday spoke at a seminar hosted by the International Center for Defense and Security in Tallinn, Estonia. He praised the country for its courage in allowing him to speak in public in his official capacity as a government minister of Taiwan.
The situation is particularly tense at the moment, as China objects to reports of a prospective Taiwanese representative office being set up in Tallinn.
That same day, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) urged Estonia to abide by its “solemn commitment” to the “one China” principle, specifically by “refraining from allowing Taiwan to set up any official organizations and effectively safeguarding the political basis of bilateral relations.”
Behind these events lie a recognition of political courage, Tallinn’s geopolitical balancing act and a not-so-veiled threat from an insecure Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Wang’s use of the phrase “solemn commitment” is interesting. Is adherence to a “one China” policy, which Wang called the “one China” principle — the distinction is important — really “solemn”? It depends on the perspective. Beijing would have other countries’ governments regard the agreement as a “solemn commitment” because the CCP wants to keep alive the “one China” fiction of Taiwan as an “inalienable part” of China. Beijing wants Tallinn to see it as a solemn commitment, as opposed to an agreement between two governments that it is, to underline the implied threat.
Neither Estonia nor Taiwan are young countries, but the former only became free and independent from the Soviet Union after its fall in 1991, and Taiwan, with its long and storied past, had its most recent “liberation” through the democratic reforms that led to its first direct presidential election in 1996.
Both feel the breath of totalitarian neighbors against their necks; both understand what it is to live under unforgiving regimes. Talk of shared values is not empty rhetoric, it has history and substance.
Aside from that, there are few substantial ties between the two, with insignificant trade figures and little tourist traffic to speak of.
For a long time, the messaging out of Tallinn, whether from the government or the pro-Taiwan Reform Party, was that there was no interest in opening a Taiwan representative office, even though the latter would ideally like to see it happen. Why the change, especially if it is going to irk Beijing so?
According to the Estonian embassy in Beijing, Estonia supports its “one China” policy, and in return, Beijing promises to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Estonia.
Marko Mihkelson of the Reform Party, who has served on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu, Estonia’s parliament, since 2003, has questioned the wisdom of being simultaneously at diplomatic odds with Russia and China.
Estonia fears Russia. It understands the importance of aligning with the EU and the US. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it balanced this by maintaining good relations with China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, because it believed Beijing would push back against Russian aggression.
However, values matter. China’s military drills around Taiwan and its human rights issues convinced Estonia to leave the “16+1” China-Central Eastern Europe forum, but the invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s refusal to denounce the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin has radically altered the calculus.
Behind the events that had Wu praising Tallinn’s courage lies a roiling undercurrent of changes in the international order. Beijing can talk of a “solemn commitment” from others, yet neglect its duty as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Actions have consequences. So does silence.
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