China is losing influence in the South Pacific following a reduction of its spending in the region, The Associated Press reported on Tuesday.
South Pacific countries that rely on aid are increasingly rejecting Chinese funding in favor of deals from Australia or other US allies, while China has been shifting aid to its own regional allies, the report said.
This follows efforts by the US, Australia and other countries to respond to concerns over China’s growing presence in the region, which culminated last year when China established a security pact with the Solomon Islands.
However, developments this year have largely put those concerns to rest. The US has renewed its Compacts of Free Association with Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands, and Palau has agreed to let the US build a base there.
The US also signed two security agreements with the largest South Pacific nation, Papua New Guinea (PNG), following a visit there by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May. Those agreements will give the US access to some military bases, and the second will give it access to satellite data and allow it to board PNG vessels to counter illegal fishing and trafficking.
Along with an agreement made with the Philippines early in the year that gives the US access to some bases in that country, Washington has firmly secured its influence over the first and second island chains.
Now would be an opportune time for the US to hold large-scale drills in the South China Sea and Oceania with Taiwan and other allies in the region. The drills in the South China Sea could involve landings on islands administered by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, while those in Oceania could involve bases that the US would have access to in the event of a conflict in the region.
This would send a clear message to China about the scale of a response it would face if it tried to engage any of these countries in warfare.
Countries in the region must also cooperate on conducting regular patrols of the South China Sea and should set clear boundaries to prevent Chinese aggression, such as that which has been experienced by Philippine supply vessels that have been obstructed by the Chinese Coast Guard. The South China Sea, despite being so poorly named, does not belong to China — and if that is not made clear to China now, it will only become harder to enforce freedom of navigation.
The Chinese Coast Guard and People’s Liberation Army regularly come within unsafe distances of foreign military vessels and aircraft operating in international areas in the region. China would be less likely to be so aggressive if countries always patrolled together and if surveillance was accompanied by military might.
Toward this end, countries should cooperate to fortify military installations on islands in the South China Sea not occupied by China, equipping them with high-tech radar equipment, long-range missiles and ports large enough to accommodate destroyers.
It has been argued that the Indo-Pacific region needs its own NATO. Such an alliance should be considered for first and second island chain countries. Just as NATO protects its members from Russian aggression, so could such an alliance in the Indo-Pacific protect its members from Chinese aggression.
If a clear resolve to cooperate on defense and the protection of respective sovereignty is not expressed by countries in the region, China would seek to sow divisions and turn friends against each other.
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