To trace the source of illegally modified firearms and deter gangsters from openly firing them, a set of draft amendments to the Controlling Guns, Ammunition and Knives Act (槍砲彈藥刀械管制條例) was approved by a meeting of the Cabinet on Oct. 5. The proposed amendments raise the status of banned imitation guns to be regulated under criminal law, while their ammunition and components are listed under administrative penalties. A further amendment adds the offense of firing a gun in a public place. These amendments are a step in the right direction, and should be welcomed as such.
The act involves not only a legal question of criminal penalties and sanctions, but is also inseparable from source management and inspection. It also requires expert knowledge about firearms, ammunition and other weapons, which makes it almost impossible for departments concerned with the management of business and industry to amend the act on their own. Therefore, although the act has been amended 14 times since it was originally formulated in 1983, the reality is that the more it has been amended, the more widespread illegal and modified firearms have become. Furthermore, some parts of the act, such as those concerning indigenous people’s “self-made hunting guns,” have given rise to public resentment.
Careful reading of the current set of draft amendments shows that they are all correct in principle, but there are still many things that need to be improved. Let us consider the most important ones.
First, the act should completely abandon the names of gun types and change to regulating them based on definitions, and the same applies to knives. Germany’s Weapons Act could be a useful point of reference. Rapid technological advances mean that weapons are constantly being updated. Consequently, some of the kinds of weapons listed in the act at the time of its enactment, such as traditional carbines and brass knuckles, are now outdated. The problem with using the names of weapon types to determine the punishment for possession is that this formula cannot adapt to technological advancements, and this gives lawbreakers more loopholes to exploit.
Second, the model of legislating the offense of shooting a gun in a public place should be adjusted. The addition of this offense is well intended, but the model of legislation of the draft amendment is such that in some circumstances it cannot achieve its aim of imposing a more severe punishment. If person A shoots person B dead in a park, based on the stipulation of Article 55 of the Criminal Code (刑法) that “where an act constitutes several offenses, only the most severe punishment shall be imposed,” person A can only be punished by the statutory penalty for homicide, leaving no possibility of making the punishment more severe.
The third point concerns adding a legal basis for reviewing low-power guns. When a merchant imports low-power guns with the intention of selling them in Taiwan, the National Police Agency (NPA) now gives or denies permission based on the “regulations governing the inspection and importation of low-power guns” (低動能槍枝輸入審查規定), and these regulations are based on the proviso contained in Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Foreign Trade Act (貿易法), which reads: “Export/import of goods shall be liberalized provided, however, that restriction thereof may be imposed by reason of the requirements of international treaty… national defense [or] social security.”
However, the competent authority of the Foreign Trade Act is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, so the authority to publish such regulations and approve or deny permission for such items does not lie with the NPA, but now the NPA has itself drawn up regulations to give or deny such permission.
From the perspective of maintaining public security, the NPA should be commended for boldly tackling this issue. However, from the perspective of the legal system and the powers and responsibilities vested in various government agencies, this is not the right way to go about it. To thoroughly sort this out, a basis for the reviewing standards of low-power guns should be added to the act, so as to comply with the legal system and actual needs.
Fourth, the latter part of Article 18, Paragraph 4 of the act, which reads: “Any person who refuses to confess or provides a false statement shall have the penalties increased by one third” should be deleted, because it clearly contravenes the constitutional principle of non-self-incrimination. Among all the laws of this country, this one could become a joke among countries where the rule of law prevails, so it is a good thing that no judge has ever applied this clause.
The public hopes that the authorities can crack down on illegal guns, prevent modified guns and vigorously uphold public safety. Everyone can see how courageous the NPA has been in assuming responsibility for this task.
The current set of draft amendments are aimed in the right direction, which is admirable. However, it is a pity that some obvious defects in the act have not been corrected.
Wu Yaw-tzung is a professor in Central Police University’s Department and Graduate Institute of Law.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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