The Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) presidential candidate, New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), on Thursday last week revealed his energy policy, saying that he would not phase out nuclear power if elected. He would also reopen all decommissioned nuclear power plants, and review the decision to stop construction of the never-finished Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in New Taipei City’s Gongliao District (貢寮).
Setting goals of reaching a “zero-coal Taiwan” by 2040 and a “net zero Taiwan” by 2050, Hou said that if elected, he would restart the Jinshan and Guosheng nuclear power plants in New Taipei City’s Shihmen (石門) and Wanli (萬里) districts, and extend the life of Pingtung County’s Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant, while establishing a safety review committee to assess the possibility of finishing the Gongliao plant.
Ignoring that nuclear power accounted for only 8 percent of Taiwan’s electricity generation and 6.9 percent of power consumption in the first half of this year, opposition presidential candidates are again looking to nuclear power as a magic elixir to achieve the nation’s zero carbon emission goal — and as a strategic campaign weapon.
Hou plans to raise nuclear power’s contribution to the nation’s energy mix to 18 percent. Taiwan Power Party Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who is also running for president, has similarly called for restarting and extending the life of nuclear power plants.
Only Vice President William Lai (賴清德), the Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate, has vowed to stick to his party’s goal of making Taiwan a nuclear-free country by 2025. Still, he does not rule out keeping some nuclear power capability in case of emergencies such as a Chinese-led blockade or an invasion.
None of the candidates have come up with feasible plans to deal with the problems surrounding nuclear power, including the disposal of spent fuel rods, some of which are kept in reactors due to a lack of storage space. They also have not addressed issues with storing nuclear waste, especially highly radioactive waste. More than 100,000 barrels of low-level radioactive waste on Orchid Island (Lanyu, 蘭嶼) need to be removed because of a storage deadline that has long since passed.
Some nuclear power advocates cite the EU as having designated nuclear power as “green” energy, but that resolution was controversial when it passed the European Parliament last year, with 278 members voting against it and 33 abstaining. The parliament also set a strict requirement for proper nuclear waste disposal.
Hou and Ko need to specify assurances for the safety of nuclear power, especially the Gongliao plant, the construction of which has been suspended for three decades, especially as voters in a 2021 referendum rejected finishing and operating it.
However, the bigger problem for Hou and Ko is “integrity.” As the New Taipei city mayor, Hou has repeatedly said that with “no solution for nuclear waste, no nuclear power,” and “no safety, no nuclear power.” He and his administration also persistently rejected Taiwan Power Co’s proposal to build a new dry storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, although a court ruled in favor of the utility in a lawsuit against the city.
Ko in 2021 also soundly opposed the referendum on the Gongliao plant, and said that given Taiwan’s limited space and high population, there would always be unsolved issues with nuclear waste storage and how to evacuate areas near plants in a nuclear disaster. “It is the reality Taiwan should face,” he has said.
Politicians always make U-turns on their positions for electoral gains, but energy policy and long-term safety should never be a sacrifice or trade-off. This is what Taiwanese should recognize when they cast their votes next year.
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