Typhoon Doksuri hit China’s southeastern provinces late last month and made its way north to Hebei Province. Severe flooding wreaked havoc on hundreds of towns in Hebei, washing away vehicles and bridges, destroying roads, and engulfing businesses, homes and farmland. Chinese state media on Friday said at least 29 people had died, while 16 were missing and more than 1.75 million people had been relocated. Direct economic losses were initially estimated at about US$13.2 billion.
Meanwhile, in the wake of Typhoon Khanun, heavy rain fell on the mountainous areas of central and southern Taiwan on Saturday last week. Data from the Central Weather Bureau showed that 1,051mm of rain fell on Nantou County’s Renai Township (仁愛) over 72 hours. Aside from serious flooding, dozens of people in mountain villages were temporarily stranded as roads were cut off by landslides. In Renai, a gas station was buried by a landslide, and part of the foundations of a hotel were washed away, while many roads are still covered in mud. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that the agricultural losses in Nantou from Typhoon Khanun were about NT$167.56 million (US$5.27 million).
While the floods in Taiwan and China occurred just a few days apart, people from both countries have posted online about the stark differences in disaster response measures. This highlights the difference between how the authoritarian government in China and the democratic government in Taiwan value the lives of their people.
Chinese state media reported that Hebei officials on July 31 opened floodgates and spillways in seven low-lying flood control zones, to divert floodwater and prevent rivers and reservoirs from overflowing into Beijing and Tianjin. Consequently, the city of Zhuozhou and surrounding farmlands were submerged. Zhuozhou residents said that they did not receive government warning, and a local newspaper reported that outside rescue teams needed to obtain an “invitation letter” from local authorities before it could enter the city and take action.
Chinese state media on Thursday last week reported that Hebei Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary Ni Yuefeng (倪岳峰) ordered the activation of flood diversion measures, saying the flooded areas would “resolutely serve as a ‘moat’ for the capital.”
President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and Vice President William Lai (賴清德) on Tuesday last week expressed their condolences to victims of the disaster in China in posts on X, formerly known as Twitter. Tsai on Saturday last week ordered military personnel and top Cabinet officials to reinforce rescue efforts in Nantou, and she visited flood-hit areas on Tuesday.
In contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Chinese Premier Li Qiang (李強) remain absent from the flood scene, while foreign media reported that Xi and top CCP leaders are believed to have started their annual vacation at the Beidaihe seaside resort, which is in Hebei, but was not affected by the floods. From Saturday last week, Chinese state media started publishing long propaganda reports touting Xi’s “strong and powerful” response to the severe floods in Beijing, saying that he had given important instructions regarding flood prevention and rescue measures early last month.
While the stark difference between the two governments’ disaster response measures can be seen in multiple credible media reports, there was still disinformation spreading on online forums last week, including a post with a photograph of Tsai on a military vehicle visiting flooded areas in Chiayi County in 2018 alongside a photograph of late Chinese leader Jiang Zemin (江澤民) walking in floodwater.
Taiwanese people must remain aware of Chinese propaganda in its many forms, including false disaster news, which is only expected to increase before the presidential and legislative elections in January next year.
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