The total area of agricultural land designated as “low soil fertility” in Taiwan is not insignificant: It consists of 18,155 hectares, of which 3,871 hectares are in Yunlin County, followed by 2,707 hectares in Kaohsiung, 1,511 hectares in Chiayi County, 716 hectares in Pingtung County and 102 hectares in Changhua County.
For several years the government has been projecting a concern with environmental protection, sustainability and energy saving, focused on photovoltaic green energy. The question is, are photovoltaic solar panels as good as what the government’s messaging suggests?
First, the manufacturing process of solar panels is similar to that of the semiconductor industry, with its high energy consumption, high pollution and difficulties in recycling.
Second, to install solar panels, farmland must be covered with cement, and the ground must be compacted using machines, which would substantially affects drainage.
Third, the installation of solar panels would inevitably affect planting and other agricultural operations. In addition, neglected farmland might lead to weeds, diseases and pests, which in turn would affect neighboring fields.
Fourth, domestic research has discovered that agricultural land under solar panels lacks sunlight and vegetation, and that it is difficult to replenish organic matter, thus causing soils to become degraded.
Fifth, international research has confirmed that the temperature at solar power stations is 3°C to 4°C higher than surrounding areas. If the central government forcefully promotes green energy zones and insists on installing solar panels on more than 10,000 hectares of agricultural land, Taiwan’s contribution to warming and, therefore, extreme weather is only likely to increase.
Sixth, solar manufacturers say that they will create jobs, but the jobs created are at most cleaning jobs that help maintain solar panels on a regular basis. Not only would this fail to bring about any substantial benefits to the local economy, but it also runs counter to the spirit of “regional revitalization” advocated by the central government.
Finally, government policy dictates that the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Bureau of Energy is responsible for purchasing the photovoltaic companies’ output.
SHORTCOMINGS
The average rate of the wholesale price of renewable energy, according to figures published this year, is NT$4.4 per kilowatt-hour. The non-peak electricity price of state-run Taiwan Power Co (Taipower) outside of the summer months for households is NT$2.89 per kilowatt-hour, and the summer price is NT$3.52.
Therefore, the price difference between Taipower tariffs and renewable energy is covered by the government’s budget. In other words, solar power is being paid for by the taxpayer.
However, even though the shortcomings of installing solar panels on agricultural land have been long known, the ruling party keeps pressing for its unrealistic election promise of delivering a “nuclear-free homeland” by 2025, taking advantage of Taiwan’s precious agricultural land resources and trying to designate 18,155 hectares of agricultural land as green energy zones.
For the implementation of the Spatial Planning Act (國土計畫法), the central government forced the southern administrative regions to reserve a specific amount of agricultural land, which was not allowed to be used for industrial and commercial development.
FOOD SECURITY
The reason the government gave at the time was that the agricultural regions in the south had the responsibility to ensure Taiwan’s food security.
For the solar photovoltaic industry, 18,155 hectares of farmland can be transferred to other uses. Does this mean that food security is no longer important, or that the previously asserted concern for food security was unwarranted?
The government also deems agricultural land allocated to the green energy special zone as having “low soil fertility,” meaning that it is unsuitable for agricultural production. The idea is that developing the sustainable energy industry on such land would produce greater benefits.
However, when the Executive Yuan’s Ministry of Agriculture, formerly known as council of agriculture, which oversees agricultural affairs, uses the concept of “soil fertility,” it reveals its ignorance of modern, high-tech agriculture.
Many high-value crops have been cultivated in greenhouses off the ground, and the adoption of “precision agriculture” can create greater efficiency and benefits. Even on land with low fertility, animal husbandry can still be developed. In other words, “low soil fertility” is not a problem for high-tech agriculture.
Even the agricultural land with high soil salinity and hard clay such as that along the coast of Pingtung County can yield “black pearl” wax apples, renown for their sweetness.
Therefore, if limited by the traditional concept of “soil fertility,” Taiwan’s agriculture would only continue to fall far behind the rest of the world, and it would never be possible to move forward.
POLICY
The government’s intention to assist the solar photovoltaic industry by designating land on which solar panels can be used clearly violates the spirit of food security it previously declared. The solar panels that have been widely installed in agricultural counties and in the cities of southern Taiwan have not only been unsuccessful in creating jobs for farmers, but have also failed to revitalize the rural economy and the agricultural development of the nation.
The development of the solar photovoltaic industry has brought about numerous disadvantages, and the government should reconsider its policy approach.
In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture should look at the bigger picture for Taiwan’s agriculture, which would show agricultural regions what they should expect when dealing with the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Chang Li-shan is Yunlin county commissioner.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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