“Good fences make good neighbors” is a dictum that China seems to disregard, particularly concerning India-China relations. Restoring the pre-Galwan “status quo” at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a forthright approach to normalizing India-China relations.
However, it appears unlikely that relations with China are to be normalized in the near future.
Recently, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said: “Until there is peace and tranquility in border areas, the relationship between the two countries cannot progress.”
Indian leadership and officials are in agreement on this matter. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministers’ meeting in New Delhi in late April, Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh reiterated this stance to Chinese Minister of National Defense General Li Shangfu (李尚福). He emphasized that the violation of existing agreements has undermined the fundamental basis of the bilateral relationship.
The unattainability of normalization does not stem from a lack of effort or desire on India’s part, but rather from the absence of proactive steps from China. The border dispute and recurrent standoffs continue to be contentious matters between the two nations. Under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India places utmost importance on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is working to reinforce its border policy and reshape its outlook on China.
India’s China policy comprises two crucial aspects: Keeping negotiation channels open and highlighting the significance of resolving the border dispute without sidelining it any longer. China, without making enough of an effort to address India’s concerns, is trying to propagate a narrative that the situation at the LAC is already normal and that India is aligning with the US to contain China. China’s refusal to recognize India as an equal partner demonstrates its failure to acknowledge and address India’s legitimate concerns.
Over the past three decades, India has consistently advocated peaceful coexistence with China.
However, China’s notion of coexistence seems to involve India kowtowing to its demands and completely disregarding India’s own territorial integrity.
China is misreading India. Despite being a significant counterweight to China in the region, India has no intention of containing China. Instead, it seeks a return to the pre-Galwan clashes state of relations.
The issue lies not only in the persistence of the border dispute for seven decades, but also in China’s reluctance to pursue a resolution to this longstanding conflict. Instead of providing reassurances, China denies any alteration to the “status quo” at the LAC.
So, what prevents China from normalizing ties with India? Two factors come into play:
First, the Global South seems to exhibit greater receptiveness toward India compared with China. India is increasingly acknowledged as a representative voice of the Global South.
Notably, Papua New Guinean Prime Minister James Marape made a statement during Modi’s visit to the Pacific island nation, recognizing India as “the leader of the Global South.”
China perceives India as undeserving of the recognition it receives on regional and global platforms.
Second, China believes that by perpetuating the border dispute and maintaining a simultaneous two-front threat, it can weaken India and hinder its alignment with the US-led anti-China coalition.
China expects India to accept the recurring standoffs and illegal occupation of territory, withdraw from the US-led anti-China coalition, abandon the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and maintain neutrality, while China continues supporting Pakistan against India, objects to India’s bid to join the UN Security Council and treats India as an unequal partner.
China offers no solution other than hoping and waiting for India to abandon its policy of prioritizing the resolution of the dispute.
Over the past three years, recognition of China as a primary threat has intensified. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s assertive behavior has become a unifying force and catalyst for cooperation among like-minded countries.
China’s unwavering stance is a blessing in disguise for India. It has prompted India to re-evaluate its relationship with China and enhance its partnerships with other nations that share similar apprehensions. Consequently, India is playing a pivotal role in shaping the liberal international order, in which China is progressively finding itself marginalized.
China’s inclination to perceive its bilateral relations with India through the prism of the US-China rivalry is fundamentally flawed. This is where China’s approach toward India falters.
However, for India, relations with China are still considered important and substantive, but until China pays sufficient attention to India’s concerns and works to address them, there will be no normalization in ties.
It is crucial for China to refrain from employing the dispute as a means of coercion. Embracing and reconciling with India’s growing stature on regional and global stages is essential to stabilizing and normalizing India-China relations.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations and a post-doctoral fellow at the Taiwan Asia Exchange Foundation.
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