At a recent BRICS meeting in Cape Town, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa refocused on the alternative to growing Western consolidation against Moscow and Beijing.
BRICS provides an alternate development model, but is mired in emerging bipolarity. China, which dominates the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is also seeking to dominate BRICS, trying to shape it into a body to challenge the Western view of the world.
While BRICS has a fulsome agenda, particularly in the Ukraine crisis and post-COVID-19 pandemic period, the foreign ministers focused on expanding BRICS and moving toward a so-called common currency. Both these of these are Chinese efforts, backed by Russia, to bring greater heft to BRICS by weaning away middle powers who are often also US allies.
It is also an effort to strike against US-led sanctions by encouraging economic engagement in non-US dollar currencies.
India pursues its own emphasis. Its main effort is to prevent BRICS from being dominated by China and it seeks genuine multilateralism through reform of the UN, particularly the UN Security Council. India aims to keep BRICS aligned against terrorism in all its manifestations.
While China pays lip service to these ideas, it tries to push them lower on the agenda and accept them tangentially.
On Security Council reform, China never speaks about new permanent members; where terrorism is concerned, it is agreeable in principle, but in practice blocks references to Pakistan-based terrorists in UN committees.
Rather than becoming an alternative development model, China — using the resources of the New Development Bank — is pushing BRICS, with quiet Russian support, to expand the cohort of countries who oppose the US-led global perspective and follow Chinese tenets to use international institutions that favor China.
India does not often disagree over policy decisions, but there is divergence when it come to intent.
Ideally, BRICS should have balanced itself against Chinese hegemony by reviving the spirit of India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA), which predated BRICS. Had the IBSA spirit worked, China and Russia would not have held sway over BRICS.
However, the IBSA spirit has been supplanted by divergent ideals.
Brazil is hedging its bets. South Africa promised to be the flagbearer of Africa with the theme “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for mutually accelerated growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism.” It has actually aided the Chinese gambit by pushing for expansion and inviting to the Cape Town meeting 13 of the 19 countries who it says sought BRICS membership.
India maintains a criteria-based approach for expansion. South Africa agreed with India last year, but has since moved toward a sudden expansion as sought by China.
Brazil could be a swing state, but without India’s assent, a consensus is unlikely to emerge. As in the SCO, and so in BRICS, India understands that it could be isolated. It realizes the value of standing up for its views and not letting China easily have its way. The diminishment of Russian power has been detrimental to New Delhi’s objectives.
Assuming that there are indeed 19 nations that have either applied for or shown interest in joining BRICS, it seems that middle powers want to keep their options open in a divided world. For them, joining BRICS would give them recognition as middle powers.
Most believe that by joining BRICS, they would become eligible for New Development Bank funding. The bank provides funding only to its members. In 2021, it admitted Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.
The mix of countries that evince interest is curious. Some of them are perennial hopefuls. Some are close to South Africa, others dependent on China for admission. The criteria for admission is undetermined.
From Asia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Kazakhstan have been mentioned; from Africa: Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria; from Latin America: Argentina.
The South African role is unclear. If it really wants to stand up for Africa, it should be supporting the African position of seeking equitable regional representation. Nigeria from the west, and Algeria or Egypt from the north, should be acceptable, but what about central and east Africa, from where South Africa did not invite any countries to the Friends of BRICS meeting?
While promoting Africa, South Africa is itself not supporting African preferences.
The criteria for South Africa’s proposed expansion also remain unclear. For India, objectivity is easier, because it has no particular candidate that it sees as an advantageous addition.
Whatever countries are admitted will be beholden to China due to its economic clout. India does not want to be seen as wielding veto power over its friends’ aspirations to be in BRICS.
The push for setting criteria is actually a battle to choose partners that would be more amenable to current BRICS members. India has been approached by some Asian and African countries, but their aspirations do not all match the criteria that are likely to evolve. India is unlikely to agree to a large expansion — five new members might be preferred, as long as BRICS’ character is maintained.
India should obtain some leverage with new members who must fully contribute to the New Development Bank.
Gurjit Singh is a former Indian ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia and the African Union.
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