In the past few years, “toad worship” culture has become an Internet phenomenon in China. “Toad” is a nickname for former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who always appeared in public wearing large thick-rimmed glasses. The nickname is used to avoid Internet censorship. Toad worshipers in the past few days have been signaling their respect for the memory of Jiang, who died last week.
Toad worship became a phenomenon after Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) took office. The belief is that the worshipers are appropriating the past to evaluate the present. Part of this sensation is the recognition of Jiang’s credentials and achievements.
Jiang graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University and trained in engineering in Moscow. He could speak eight languages, and once recited in English former US president Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.
By comparison, Xi graduated with a doctorate from Tsinghua University, but he often mispronounces words. The late top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official Li Rui (李銳) once said that Xi’s cultural level was “elementary.”
Unlike the grim-faced former Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and the rigid Xi, Jiang was more willing to show individual personality.
When he met the king of Spain, he took out a comb to tidy his hair. He once lashed out at a Hong Kong journalist, without hiding his anger. He did not refrain from looking at attractive women in public.
Even though some of these anecdotes could be seen as unbefitting of a president, Jiang was more valuable as a leader than a poser trying to endear himself to the people by eating with them and trying to recreate a cult of personality.
Most importantly, a leader should be judged by their performance. Jiang often said: “Keep silent and make a fortune,” which could be considered his guideline for governing China.
He learned a lesson from the reckless economic reforms of the 1980s, so he tried to open up China gradually. Under his leadership, the country joined the WTO and Beijing won its bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.
In terms of foreign relations, Jiang chose not to compete directly with the US. He was restrained when dealing with the US’ search of the China-based container ship Yinhe in 1993 and the US bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.
Xi, by comparison, began clashing with the US immediately after taking office, escalating a trade dispute and engaging in “wolf warrior diplomacy.”
Jiang was far from a perfect leader. He seized control of the editorial board of the now-defunct World Economic Herald and cracked down on Falun Gong members. There were rumors of bribery and corruption in his term, and after he stepped down, he retained his power in the military for some time.
All these are minor compared with Xi’s strict control of the media, establishment of concentration camps in Xinjiang, complete surveillance of citizens, appointment of his own clique, detention of dissidents and the abolition of term limits.
Toad worshipers, while commemorating Jiang, express discontent with Xi.
The death of former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來) in 1976 and CCP leader Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) in 1989 gave rise to two anti-government movements. Whether the “Blank Paper Movement” keeps growing along with Jiang’s death deserves attention.
Yang Chung-hsin is a civil servant.
Translated by Liu Yi-hung
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