Founded in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has remained in power for 73 years since 1949. Despite changes of leadership, the CCP remains the ruling party. The CCP’s 20th National Congress is set to open on Oct. 16, and the confirmation of the date implies the settlement of personal and political disputes inside the party.
The central ideology of the CCP has kept evolving — from Marxism-Leninism, and former Chinese leaders Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) doctrines, to former Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin’s (江澤民) “Three Represents,” Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) “Scientific Development Concept,” and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) Xi Jinping Thought.
The CCP has 96 million members, making it the largest civilian organization on Earth. Currently, 2,300 delegates are chosen to attend the party congress, during which about 200 full members and about 160 alternate members would be elected to the 20th Central Committee, the highest authority of the CCP.
In addition, 25 top officials would be elected to the politburo and seven leaders would be elected to the Politburo Standing Committee, including the general secretary serving as the Chinese president. Together, the group of seven would form the next generation of CCP leadership.
Due to political disputes, the CCP in 1982 replaced its single leadership system under a party chair with a collective leadership system under the general secretary.
The way in which the CCP’s national leaders are selected is unique in that they are not directly elected, but are selected based on their administrative performance. A person who begins to work for the party upon graduating from college at the age of 22 starts at the township level and gradually works their way up to the municipal or provincial level. To proceed, they must have experience leading two municipalities or provinces, of which one has to be poor and the other rich, such as serving as municipal party secretary or governor, by the age of 50.
If everything goes well, they would be transferred to the central government responsible for national affairs, serving as minister or vice premier for one term before being promoted to vice president by 55. At this post, they cannot only observe how to handle the presidency, but also start to become familiar with international affairs.
After serving a five-year term as vice president, they would be expected to take the presidency by 60. By that time, they would have sufficient experience in dealing with local, national and international affairs.
After taking office, if a president can gradually — and firmly — control the military, the propaganda machinery, politics, the judiciary and finance, they would be able to stabilize the regime. This had been the succession model when Hu and Xi took office in 2002 and 2012 respectively.
However, following a constitutional amendment in 2018, Xi is likely to serve an unprecedented third five-year term as president. According to Xinhua news agency and other news outlets, there is no doubt he will continue to lead.
The Politburo Standing Committee has an unspoken rule known as “67 up, 68 down,” which means that a member can stay on the committee if he is 67 or younger at the time of a party congress, but he must retire if he is 68 or older. Current committee members are Xi, 69, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), 67, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Li Zhanshu (栗戰書), 72, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Yang (汪洋), 67, First Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP Wang Huning (王滬寧), 67, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Zhao Leji (趙樂際), 65, and Chinese First Vice Premier Han Zheng (韓正), 68.
Additionally, although Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan (王岐山), 74, is not on the committee, his special case deserves attention. After Wang Qishan retired from the committee five years ago, he became vice president as a regular CCP member. Despite not holding any party post, he ranks second only to Politburo Standing Committee members and enjoys preferential political treatment.
This a deliberate arrangement by Xi, who does not want to appoint a successor as vice president too early. If Li Zhanshu follows Wang Qishan’s example by taking over the vice presidency, Xi’s real successor would need to wait for at least five more years.
Wang Yang is the most popular choice for premier, while Li Keqiang is likely to head the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and Han of the “Shanghai gang” might head the consultative conference, so the three Politburo Standing Committee members could stay in power.
As for new members: First, CCP Committee Secretary of Shanghai Li Qiang (李強), 63, might replace Zhao because of the importance of the city.
Next, director of the General Office of the CCP Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), 60, who is a close aide to Xi, might replace Wang Huning, who has served three Chinese presidents, to control theories and thoughts.
Finally, as Chinese Second Vice Premier Hu Chunhua (胡春華), 61, who is not only relatively young and talented, but also associated with the Communist Youth League of China, might replace Han as the first vice premier.
A new situation would be formed after half of the current committee members are replaced.
The posts would be confirmed at the national party congress. Key government posts, such as the president and premier, would not be confirmed until the people’s congress approves the appointments in March next year, after which the new party-state machine would officailly begin to operate.
What is particularly noteworthy is that Xi is likely to propose a new Taiwan policy during the party congress. He is expected to follow a recent white paper, titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” with an emphasis on the situation following unification. This would be the beginning of new challenge across the Taiwan Strait.
Tang Shao-cheng is a research fellow at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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