At the annual Aspen Security Forum last week, CIA Director Bill Burns and MI6 Chief Richard Moore gave their respective opinions on the current level of threat faced by Taiwan, and revealed a subtle difference of opinion that could prove significant for Taiwan’s security.
Burns played down fears that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) might take military action against Taiwan after the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress in November — when it is expected that Xi would secure a convention-busting third term as president — but added that the risk of military action increases as the decade progresses.
Burns also said Beijing appears “unsettled” by Russia’s “strategic failure” in Ukraine and that China likely drew the lesson that “You’ve got to amass overwhelming force if you’re going to contemplate that [invasion of Taiwan] in the future,” suggesting that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has bought Taiwan more time.
Burn’s comments were broadly in line with previous intelligence assessments released into the public domain by Taiwanese and US military officials over the past 12 months.
However, Moore struck a slightly more cautious note, saying it is too early to tell what lessons China will draw from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
There are many signs that Chinese officials are “going into overdrive” to analyze the Ukraine situation and draw the right conclusions, Moore said. However, party ideology and officials seeking to please Xi ahead of November’s congress are clouding the picture, so analysts are finding it difficult to read the tea leaves at present, he added.
Moore could be hinting that hawks within the upper echelons of the party are egging Xi on to roll the dice on Taiwan. He added that Xi is watching Ukraine “like a hawk,” which means it is essential that the West “toughs it out” in Ukraine, and helps Ukrainians either win the war “or at least negotiate from a position of significant strength.”
Moore repeated concerns first made during a speech delivered in December last year that, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi appears to have bought into an entrenched narrative of Western weakness, which could lead China’s leader to miscalculate — particularly over Taiwan. Moore’s observation is timely, with tensions between Washington and Beijing threatening to boil over due to reports that US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi might visit Taiwan later this summer.
The New York Times on Monday reported that officials within US President Joe Biden’s administration view the trip as high risk. Speaking to the newspaper, one former high-ranking US Department of State official warned that the trip could be perceived as a humiliation of Xi’s leadership at an “extremely tense” time for domestic politics in China.
US Senator Chris Coons, who deals with the Biden administration often on Taiwan issues, said in an interview with the Times on Sunday: “One school of thought is that the lesson is ‘go early and go strong’ before there is time to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses... And we may be heading to an earlier confrontation — more a squeeze than an invasion — than we thought.”
Any significant military action against Taiwan would have to rely on the element of surprise. As Beijing has made no secret of its intentions, pre-empting the timescales of Taiwan’s and the West’s intelligence assessments by launching an “early” invasion would be a way to achieve this. Moreover, Biden’s rock-bottom approval ratings and his perceived frailty could lead Xi and his inner circle of hawkish advisers to conclude that the time to act is now.
Taiwan cannot afford to let its guard down. With the danger of miscalculation by Xi a real possibility, Taiwan’s military and national security apparatus must remain vigilant.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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