The global order is in a state of flux. The US and the EU are looking to redefine their roles and establish relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, while China has been working hard to consolidate its engagement with Europe, and more recently aligned itself with Russia. The US and China are discovering that they need to reappraise how they build these relationships, as small and middle powers are losing patience with being taken for granted.
Internal ideological battles in Taiwan’s main political parties show that the nation is undecided which side — the US or China, or both — it wants to align with.
The Democratic Progressive Party, especially under President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), has aligned itself firmly with the US, while the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) position is more nuanced, despite KMT Chairman Eric Chu’s (朱立倫) US-friendly statements during his visit to Washington. Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) led the KMT more into China’s sphere of influence than any other of its past leaders.
The Taiwan People’s Party has established itself as a viable third force in Taiwan’s politics, and its chairman, Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), has shown himself to be more open to alignment with China.
However, most Taiwanese have lost patience with Beijing’s attempts to force them to choose.
The US appears to be learning that its previous attitude to smaller countries will no longer cut it; China has yet to learn that lesson, as seen at the Shangri-la Dialogue security summit in Singapore and by how it has treated central eastern European countries that have been friendly to Taiwan.
Beijing has been trying to build bridges with the region, beginning with the 2012 China and Central and Eastern European Countries Initiative — also known as “16+1” — to supplement Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) Belt and Road Initiative.
The promises of investment in major infrastructure projects and increased trade Beijing made to the European initiative members — originally numbering 16, then 17 when Greece joined in 2019, and now again 16 after Lithuania left last year — turned out to be hollow. Starved of support or attention from China, the initiative is walking dead.
During an interview in Tokyo on Tuesday last week, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis said that none of the European initiative members could pinpoint any benefit from it.
Czech Senate President Milos Vystrcil has said that he considers the format nonfunctional and that it was only introduced to increase Beijing’s influence in the region. He is also in favor of his country withdrawing.
However, it is the pitfalls of economic cooperation with a totalitarian regime that uses economic tools for political ends, as the member states learned from China’s overbearing response to Lithuania and the Czech Republic’s overtures to Taiwan. They did not suspect that the initiative was meant to limit their freedom to engage with Taiwan.
Perhaps more problematic for many eastern European countries worried about Russian aggression was Xi’s announcement of Beijing’s and Moscow’s friendship “without limits” just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as Xi’s refusal to condemn Moscow’s actions. China does not seem to understand eastern European countries’ reservations about support for Russia.
Vystrcil has praised the international community for its support of Prague after Beijing started exerting pressure, but said that Lithuania did not receive the same level of support. He said that any withdrawal from the 16+1 initiative would be more effective if it were a coordinated, planned effort.
It is this unity that small and medium-sized nations need to rely on in dealing with major power competition. Having the freedom to choose will make it more likely that they enter an alliance as firm partners.
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