The Hong Kong chief executive election is scheduled for May 8, with incumbent Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) having announced that she would not seek re-election. While former chief executive Leung Chun-ying (梁振英), who is vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), has been reluctant to join the race, former chief secretary for administration John Lee (李家超) announced his bid early this month.
In Hong Kong’s administrative system, the chief secretary for administration, the financial secretary and the secretary for justice serve directly under the chief executive. Among the three, the most important post is the chief secretary, who is often seen as the “second-in-command,” and former chief secretaries have been strong candidates for the chief executive office.
However, after taking his post in June last year, Lee resigned early this month to run in the election, meaning he is inexperienced, as he only briefly served in the position.
Lee, who worked in Hong Kong’s police system for years, is a former secretary for security. When anti-government protests broke out in 2019 during his term, he was accused of tolerating police violence against protesters and has been banned from entering the US due to his handling of the protests.
Surprisingly, his political career has been skyrocketing, showing that his crackdown on protesters was recognized by Chinese leaders. His promotion to the post of chief secretary serves as proof of this.
Still, his impending promotion to chief executive came much sooner than expected. Obviously, Beijing is impatient with Lam’s inability to handle the protests and to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.
A kind of “pendulum effect” of swinging between tension and relaxation can be seen in China’s handling of separatist or mass movements.
Xinjiang serves as a good example. Like Hong Kong, it has also been in the international media in the past few years over human rights issues. After conflicts broke out between Han and Uighur communities in 2009, Zhang Chunxian (張春賢), who advocated for a soft approach, was appointed to handle the matter.
However, continuing “terrorist” activity led to Zhang being replaced by Chen Quanguo (陳全國), who had advocated for a hard approach in Tibet. After Chen clamped down on “extremism” in Xinjiang, he was replaced late last year by Ma Xingrui (馬興瑞), who advocated for economic development.
During Leung’s term as chief executive, mass protests began in 2014 as part of the Umbrella movement. In 2017, Lam took the post as the first female chief executive, which Beijing saw as a move to pacify opposition in Hong Kong with “soft power.”
Unexpectedly, even larger protests took place, forcing Chinese leaders to switch to a harder approach.
Beijing’s implementation of Hong Kong’s National Security Law and amendments to the handling of chief executive and Legislative Council elections served as warning signs to Lam. Clearly, Beijing was not satisfied with her and finally decided to appoint Lee to run in the small-circle election.
Under Hong Kong’s new electoral system, all candidates must first be nominated, which would largely be handled by China’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, meaning Lee would undoubtedly become Hong Kong’s next chief executive.
He would surely carry out the Chinese leadership’s will, and try to accelerate the “mainlandization” of Hong Kong through tough measures.
Yang Chung-hsin is a civil servant.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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